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PREFACE· 
The purpose of this paper is to show that, as the 
result ot twenty-two years of intermittent warfare between 
England and the Netherlands, the English navy became es• 
tablished as the primary naval power of Europe. Also, I 
intend to illustrate that, as a by-product of this naval 
warfare, Dutch trade was seriously hurt, with the· major 
benefactors of this Dutch loss of trade being the English. 
This paper grew out of a seminar paper on the first 
Anglo•Dutch war for a Tudor and Stuart English History 
graduate seminar class taught in the fall of 1966 by Dr. 
John R. Rilling of the University or Richmond. Because 
in the present paper I attempt to cover such a large topic, 
all other aspects of English history of this period will 
be covered only insofar as they affected the Dutch wars. 
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Chapter I 
The First Anglo-Dutch War 
On the surface, war did not appear likely in 1652; 
both England and The Netherlands were protestant in re-
ligion and republican in political organization. Each 
country had agents in the other's capital working for 
closer mutual relations.1 . Indeed, there was even a vague 
dream of English republicans to unite the two nations and 
form a mighty, protestant republic. 2 
But this was only one side or the picture in 1652; 
if one looks deeper he can see underlying differences 
between the two nations. In the first place, a majority 
or the Dutch were shocked at the execution ot Charles I 
and the establishment of a republic in England.) When 
they recovered from their shock, the Dutch people gave 
support to his son, the ~ jure ruler of England, Charles 
Ir.4 This anti-republican, pro-royalist feeling would nat-
urally cause resentment in England, but, in addition to 
this, the English were jealous of Dutch wealth and trade 
which, they felt, was conducted at the expense of Englando5 
The Dutch fisheries, which were a major cornerstone of 
Dutch world trade, collected their fish in English waters 
north of Scotland.6 Also the Dutch bought unprocessed 
English cloth at low prices, dyed it and sold it back to 
the English at higher prices.7 As i£ adding insult to 
injury, the Dutch were cutting into the English trade with 
their own colonists. Thus, there was a feeling among the 
English that they were being exploited and that a good 
proportion of the wealth flowing into the Netherlands 
rightfully belonged to Englandog 
An important phase of the balance-of-trade 
argument, which came to be an obsession 
with writers of the age, derives from the 
resentments which English merchants and 
politicians felt against what they deemed 
to be England's subservience to the Dutch 
economic system. Why was treasure drain-
ing away from England? Why was trade ham-
pered and strangled by a physical scarcity 
of coin? The answer was plain. So long 
as the Dutch sucked England dry of her 
stocks of ,raw materials, there could be 
no development of England's manufacturing 
4. . . Ibid.,. ~Ibid., 
7Ibid-., gibid., 
Ibid., 
P• 48. 
P• 5. 
P• JJ. 
PPo 8-9. p.{.9'o 
capacity; no opportunity for English mer-
chants to benefit by the most profitable 
stages of the economic process. So long 
as English purchasers could be tempted in 
an uncontrolled market by succulent Dutch 
imports and so long as English importers 
were undersold by the competition of Dutch 
rivals in an open market, it was impossible 
to correct the9disequil~brium in the bal-ance of trade. 
.3 
The reason that this fear of Dutch trade seems to have 
suddenly appeared in the 1650's was that administrative 
measures against the use of Dutch-owned ships, some English 
acquisitions of ships built in Holland and Dutch involve-
ment in war in the 1620's and '30's blunted the impact of 
Dutch competition with England. With the end of the Thirty 
Years' War in 161.,8 and the virtual end of the English 
Civil War at the execution of Charles I in 1649, fear of 
the Dutch reappeared in an intensified form, shattering 
all complacency among English merchants. The initial 
reaction was a belated but widespread ·recognition by Eng-
lish shipowners of the advantages of Dutch ships in hand-
iness fo~ the carriage of bulk trade arid cheapness of 
operation and handling.10 
By the use of abundant and cheap capital, lower wages, 
timber floated down on navigable waters, more up-to-date 
methods and machinery and the use of mass production methods, 
'·3bi~., PP• 144-145. · 
1 Ra ph Davisi The Rise of the English Shipping Indus-
t=rY in the 17th & 8th Centuries (LOndon, 1962}, p.;o. 
tha Dutch could build a ship at a cost to them of four 
pounds ten shillings a ton, while it would cost seven 
pounds a ton to build that same ship in England.11 In 
1669 a ship could be built in Holland for eight hundred 
pounds that would cost thirteen hundred pounds in England. 
A larger ship, costing fourteen hundred pounds in Holland, 
would cost twenty-four hundred pounds in England.· "The 
English merchant could not build cheaply because he could 
not import timber and other materials cheaply, and he 
could not import cheaply because he could not build 
cheaply.n12 
The Dutch enjoyed this advantage in ships and ship-
building and with it the advantage of being the middleman 
for the world's goods because they started ~irst. The 
Netherlands had become "the Phonecia of modern timesnl3 
because she traded while other nations fought. England 
had a large trade with Portugal, Brazil, the Canaries 
and Madeira in sugar, "speckled wood" (mahogany), fruit 
and wine, with France in canvas. linen, brandy and wine,. 
with the Baltic countries in naval stores and with the 
Mediterranean in spices. silk, fruit and oil. England 
traded for these goods with fish, tin, lead and manu-
llnavid Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II (Ox-
ford, 1934), Vol. 1, P• 233. · 
· l2violet Barbour, rmutch and English Merchant Shipping 
in the Seventeenth Century", Economic History Review, Vol. 
II, 1930, P• 267. 
lJA. T ... Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 
1660-1783 (Boston, 1890), PP• 95-97. 
s 
taetured goods, mainly cloth. Some imports, such as to-
bacco from Virginia and Maryland and sugar from Barbados, 
were re-exported.14 
While, from our point ot view, the outlook for th~ 
growth and expansion or English trade was good, to the 
Englishman of the seventeenth century the tailure of the 
old chartered companies to provide adequate outlets for 
the export of English goods was another surface indica-
tion of Dutch superiority• The Merchant Adventurers were 
in debtJ the Levant Company was suffering from rivalry 
with the French and the frauds or its factors; the Green-
land Adventurers were ceasing to pursue the whale; the 
African Company was barely able to hold its own against 
the Dutch on the west coast of Africa; the East India 
Company'was having·its troubles with the Dutch in the 
East Indies; and the herring in British waters was being 
caught and marketed by the "Flemingsn15 within sight of 
helpless English spectators on the shore.16 
The Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 were enacted in 
14ogg, I, PP• 222·22). 
15nav1s, p. 47. · 
loogg, I, PP• 222-223. 
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order to gain 'control or the trade that rightfully belonged 
to England.17 There has long existed a view among histor-
ians that this was the direct cause of the war;lS however 
the view now held is that the Navigation Acts were only a· 
representation of the underlying causes 0£ the wars• In 
fact, the immediate effect of the Navigation Act of 1660 
was to drive the English .from the Baltic trS:de, to the 
advantage or the Dutch. The reason for this was that 
English importers had been using foreign buill!t ships tor 
their.Baltic trade,·which they were prohibited from doing 
legally.by.this act and, since Eng~ish ships were unsuitable 
for carrr/ing the bulk cargoes of the Baltic trade cheaply, 
the English were forced out.19 
Another point on which the English and Dutch conflicted 
· was the right or search. The Dutch were in favor of estab-
lishing the principle that the flag covered the safety of 
. ' 
the goods, while the English felt they had the right to 
search any neutral ships during wartime.~o 
A more immediate cause of the war was the Dutch decision 
in 1652 to add one hundred fifty warships to their existing 
17samUel Rawson Gardiner1 Histor! 0£ the Commonwealth 
and Plgteotorate (New York, 1697), .Vo~. II, pp. I46-I2;8. · 
Samuel Rawson Gardiner and c. T. Atkinson {Editors), 
Letters and Pa ers Relatin to the First Dutch War 16 2-
ndon . - 3 • 
Ogg, I; p. 2Jft. 
20w11aon, p. 58. An in.formal, undeclared, maritime war 
with France had been in exisw~nce since 1649, because France 
gave refuge and support to Charles II. Ibid. 
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fleet of seventy•six.21 While done ostensibly to make 
the English think twice before entering a war with the 
Dutch, the effect was to cause a corresponding escalation 
of war reeling in England.22 In an effort to prevent war, 
Dr. Dorislaus, a Dutclunan by birth, had baen sent over 
by .. the English as an ainbassador in 1649, 23 but ha was 
murdered by royalist assassins. The English did not use 
this as a pretext for war, however, but tried to ignore 
this violent act by sending a new embassy. While this 
embassy did not meet with open violence, the official. 
reception was cold and the reaction of the crowds, incited 
by English Royali.st · emigr~sr was angry and anti-English. 
From this. time on, .. war was· oo!lsidered only a matter of 
time.24 
. While the Dutch did not want to provoke an incident, 
they were reaching a point where they could no longer afford 
as a matter of national P,ride to back down in another con-
flict concerning the right to search. Accordingly, on May 
10~ 1652,,2.5 Lieutenant Admiral Tromp of the Dutch navy 
received instructions from the States General of the lfother-
lands to prevent Dutch ships from being searched by n.roreign 
shipsn.26 On May 15, Tromp eave instructions to his cap-
2lor the pr.ejected one hundred fifty ships, the Dutch 
built eighty•eight. Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 228. 
22Ibid., I,. .pp. 51-52. · 
23t. Stephens and Si~ey Lee~ The Dictionarz or Na~ 
tiona~ Biograph1·(London, 1917), vol. V, P• 1147. 
dijJ!!son, p. 48. 
25To avoid confusion, all dates will be given as this 
one is; aacording to the New Style or Gregori.an calendar .. 
2ooard1ner and Atkinson, I, pp. 155•159. 
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tains to.resist all attempts at boarding. 27 On the 19th• 
Tromp left Dover Bay, where he had been permitted by Com-
modore Bourne to repair damages done by a recent storm, 
and put out to sea intending to make for Calais. On the 
way, he received word (which later turned out to be ex~ 
aggarated) that a Dutch fleet had been attacked by the 
English. He immediately decided to go to their aid and 
thus encountered the English fleet. 2g 
When the commander of the English fleet, Admiral 
Blake, saw the Dutch £leet approaching, he fired three 
warning shots at Tromp's flag to indicate to Tromp that 
he should strike his £lag as was customary £or foreign 
vessels encountering English ships in the channel. In-
stead or doing this, Tromp fired a broadside at Blake·and 
ran up a red flag, .signalling his fleet to fight. 29 Al-
~ppi.tgh. outnumbered by forty capital shipsJO to twenty-· 
three, ·eight of which did not arrive until late.in the 
battle~ Blake emerged the victor, capturing one ship of 
thirty guns and probably sinking another.31 This inci-
dent was the immediate cause of the war, although the 
Dutch ambassadors in London continued to work for a peace 
~~Ibid!.; I, . pp. 165-166. 
29XSid.; I; PP• 196-199. 
30ii5id.', l, PP• 192·196. As I am using 1t here, a capital ship io one carrying 
in exgess ot thirty guns. 
· JiJ. R. Powell (Ed.), The Letters of Robert Blake (Lon-
don, 1937), PP• 158-159. 
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which was no longer possible.32 
As previously indi.oated, the Dutch were primarily a 
commercial people whose entire economy depended on trade. 
Only about ten per cent or the Dutch population was en-
gaged in agriculture; whereas twenty per cent was engaged 
in.the fishing industry and forty per cent made their living 
from trade.33 The English at this time were primarily a 
self-supporting, agricultural nation,34 whose only weakness 
exposed to attack by an enemy navy was the coastal coal 
trade from Newcastle to London.35 The Dutch were at a 
geographical disadvantage first because of the proximity 
of England and her position athwart the major Dutch trade 
routesJ6 and, secondly, because during three-quarters of 
the· year the prevailing winds in the area were westerly, 
making it very difficult for even a superior navy to 
greatly endanger the gnglish harbors on the ~forth Sea.37 
The Dutch were also at this time experiencing internal 
political 41ffioulties. There was a conflict between the 
Regents, the upper-middle class 0£ prosperous merchants 
who favored peace at all costs and a Republic {controlled 
~~Gardiner and' Atkinson, I, p. 228 • 
...,,.,Wilson, p. 31h 
5~Gardiner and Atkinson,. VI, p. 11. 
36Wilson,, P• 34. 3?~~;gin'e·rP·,·_ c5o.mmonwealth d P t t t II an ro ec ora e, , PP• 
122-123. 
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by them,·0£ course), and the Orangists, the majority of 
the population. This latter faction was staunchly Cal-
vinistic (while .the Regents had been the last to accept 
Calvinism) and favored the House or Orange over the oli· 
garchic rule of the Regents. The Orangists also did not 
want war with Eneland, but favored instead renewed war• 
fare with the Spanish papists; however, the Orangists 
were the group most af£ected by the execution of Charles 
r.3.a 
In addition to this basic division, the Dutch gov-
ernmental structure was also disunited. Each municipal-
ity ·of the Dutch Republic sent deputies to the seven 
Provincial States which, .in turn, sent deputies to the. 
States General; however, sovereignity rested ultimately 
with the niunicipalit;ies.39 The control of the Dutch 
navy was also divided among five different admiralty boards, 
each exeroisillg separate control and depending· for co-. 
ordinate· action on the States Genara1.40 A .further set-.. 
back to Dutch naval unity had been provided by the death 
of the Prince of Orange, William II, in 16;o.41 When the 
Regents gained control of the government following his 
death. ·the oldest 1 most experienced of the Dutch capt_ains 
ll 
were forced out because of their allegiance to the House 
of Orange.42 
England• on the other hand, showed a unity and strength 
ot purpose one usually associates with an efficient dic-
tatorship. Under Cromwell's rule, officials owing posts to 
court influence, purchase or seniority were replaced to a 
large extent by people who had given proof of their ability 
by their conduct in parliament or, better still, on the 
tield of battle in the recent civil war. As a result, the 
administrative head ot the English navy, the Admiralty 
Committee. strove to provide the navy with whatever it 
demanded. While it did not always fulfill this ideal, 
the administrative record of this war was one of the best 
in English naval history.43 
In March or 16S4, shortly before the end or the war, 
an English sea-captain named Foster captured a richly laden 
Dutch ship off the Dogger Bank. Since he spoke Dutch and 
the Dutch skipper spoke English, Foster asked him why the 
Dutch had entered the war when England virtually had them 
surrounded.. His answer was that the Dutch had a large, 
experienced navy, fresh from victory over Spain, whereas 
the English had a small navy.44 For this reason, the Dutch 
t~Oppenheim, p. J06. 
Jibid.' pp. 305-306., ' 
4'.;0n October 21, 16)9, Tromp completely defeated a 
Spanish fleet led by Oquendo in the Downs. G. J.·Marcus,· 
A.Naval .Histprt of Englanq,(Boston, 1961), Vol. I, P• 134• 
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hoped to hurt the English with one or two battles, forcing 
them into port to mend. While this was going on• the 
. . 
Dutch would be blockading English ports and disrupting 
the coal trade, thus forcing the English to agree to peace 
on Dutch terms. In addition, the Dutch had an ace up 
their· sleeves in the rormof Charles II who would be 
readily available in the event of a revolt in England. 
The Dutch commander blamed the Dutch defeat on the fact 
that the Prince or· Orange died in 1650 and the States · 
General turned out all his friends in the Dutch navy and 
replaced them with gentlemen creatures. He pointed out 
that the English parliament• on the other hand, turned 
out all the Kingts captains who were gentlemen and re~ 
placed them with seamen. He believed that 1r-this had 
been the other way· around, the Dutch would have won.4; 
While the eventual English victory in this war·may 
in some part be explained by the political strength or 
England as opposed to the disunity in the Netherlands, 
more ot the credit belongs to the strength and conduct 
ot the English navy. After its Elizabethan greatness, 
the navy had fallen into a period ot decay. England's 
merchant shipping expanded and the navy declined in size 
and· importance. One result of this was an increase ot · 
piracy which1 by 1640, had grown so bad that it was 
45Gardiner and Atkinson. l, PP• 31-33. 
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thought necessary to extinguish the light in the Lizard 
lighthouse because of its assistance to pirates~ Another 
result or the decline or English naval supremacy in its 
own waters was that in late October of 1639, England was 
unable to prevent a naval battle between the Dutch and 
Spanish in the Downs, England's front yard. In the latter 
days of James I and Charles I, the pendulum began to swing 
slowly the other way. Despite some setbacks, there was a 
continued slow improvement until Parliament obtained con• 
trol over the navy during the civil war. From this time 
on the navy's strength greatly increased.46 
When the English civil.war spread to the sea with the 
·detection of several capital ships because regular army 
officers were being placed'in command, the·navy.of Parliament 
was given a chance to learn the art of naval warfare against 
a relatively weak opponent. ·Although the Royalist ships 
were eventually led by Prince Rupert Whd had as many as four 
capital ships as well as lesser vessels, the navy performed 
its ~ask well. Blake; Deane and Popham were made ngenerals 
at sea" and led the" navy in pursuit ot Rupert.47 Because 
of ·this vigorous pursuit trom. Holland to Portugal to the 
Mediterranean Sea to the West Indies; Rupert's .fleet melted 
away and in 165.3, Prince Rupert had only o.ne ship left, 
4~tarcua, I; PP• 123-124. : 
" 47.Anderson, 1tOperatioris of the English Fleet", Engli,s~ 
Historical Review, 1916, PP• 406-411. , 
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with which he retired to France.48 
VJhile the Dutch navy had more ships than the English, 
the English ships, on the average, were bigger with more 
and heavier guns and more men.49 On September 5, 1653,· it 
was reported that there were one hundred forty Dutch war-
shipa50 but, as a list or June, 1652 shows,. the majority 
were not capital ships. In that list, there was only one 
ship in .excess of fifty guns, one with more than forty 
guns and there were forty ships carrying in excess or 
thirty guns •. 51 In a list of English ships of September, 
1653, there 'Were one hundred twenty-eight warships ot 
which eighty-seven were capital ships. Of these capital 
ships, there was one carrying one hundred guns, one with 
eighty-eight guns, there were three with more than sixty, 
thirteen carrying in excess or fifty guns, twenty-five 
with over £orty and forty-tour mounting more than thirty 
guns.52 As a rule, the weight of capital ships ranged 
anywhere from five hundred fifty to one thousand tons 
with ~he heavier the tonnage,. the more guns that ship 
could carry.53 Until the las~ months of the.war, no 
Dutch vessel exceded eight hundred tons and fifty-six 
guns and there was only one 0£ this type, the "Brederode"~, 
~l!arcus, I, pp. 135-136. 
0Wilson, p.·04. ~1Gard1ner and Atkinson, VI, p. 31. Ibid:,. pp. 260-266. · · ~~Gardiner and Atkinson, Vi, pp. 49-53. 
~~oppenheim,·pp. 330-JJ4. 
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Trompts flagship~54 
The major ship.used by the Duteh'merchants was the 
fluitsohip or flyboat. In its design' speed and maneu~ 
verability were sacrificed for carrying capacity and 
cheapness·of handling. As a res~lt• the boats were 
usually slow and usually unarmed.· Their.only protection 
was to travel in a convoy escorted by large numbers or 
warships.SS. 
Because the· English were not·as·heavily engaged in· 
overseas trade as the Dutch, their merchant ships were 
not designed primarily £or cargo carrying. Ot sixty-
three merchant ships in the Thames in 1653, twenty-six 
displaced .from two hundred to three hundred tons, Twenty-
i'ivo were of three hund:red to four·hundred tons, seven 
were between four hundred and four hundred £i£t7, four 
were of five hundred tons and one was six hundred tons. 
Because of their design, English merchant ships could 
easily be changed into warships or privateers;· however, 
in July of 1652, letters or marque were to be given only. 
to owners able to send out ships in excess ot two hundred 
tons and carrying more than twenty guns.S6 
·Accompanying these major dif£erenoes -were several· of 
lesser importance.. The Dutch ships were flat-bottomed 
~~Beadon, P• lJJ... - . 
Wilson, pp. 4-5. · · 
56oppenheim, pp. 34J-J44. 
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because they had to sail the shallow and sandy coasts of 
their· home waters •. While this eave them a slight advantage 
in·· avoiding the English if they ha.d to by ducking into 
shallow water, they were less weatherly than English ships 
which were £aster when sailing on a wind and better adapted 
for tacking and maneuvering. Thus, the Enc:lish were more 
success£ul in gaining the weather gauge.57 This difference 
in construction may have been the reason the hulls of Dutch 
ships were weak and unable to stand severe punishment.SS 
Another difference between the two navies was one 0£ tactics. 
The Dutch ·gunners, for the most part., fired at the r~nglish 
masts, rigging and sails in an attempt to render the gng-
lish ships helpless so that they could be captured, while 
the English gunners fired primarily at the Dutch hulls with 
the intention of sinking the ship and/or killing the men of 
the crew.S9 
In 1637. an English man-0£-war being built at Woolwitch 
in Kent was described by a man named Heywood. The ship ex-
ceeded one thousand tons with gunports for more than eighty 
guns. The length or the keel was one hundred twenty-eight 
feet and the ship me~sured forty-eight feet wide and seventy-
six feet .from the bottom of the keel to the main deok. · The 
57Marcus. ·I, p. 138. · 
5Baardiner and·Atkinson, IV, p. 3. · 
59navid Hannay, Admiral Blake (New York 1: 1886), P• 96. 
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utmost length 0£ the ship from the tip of the beakhea.d60 
to-the aft end of the stern was two hundred thirty-two 
feet. On the beakhead sat King Edgar trampling seven kings 
along with Cupid straddling and bridling a lion and six: 
other statues r~preaenting.counsel, care, industry, strength, 
virtue and victory. Emblems and symbols, pertaining to both 
land and sea, decoratttlthe rest of the ship. '-Finally, the 
whole magnificent structure was painted· gold and black• a hand-
some color for this seventeenth century idea ot a·warship.61 
While descriptions of the diff erenaes of the: warships 
may give an idea of the causes for English victory, the 
ships alone did not fight the battles ()f the first Anglo-
Dutch war; a portion of this paper must be· set aside to·. 
describe both the men who sailed and the men who com-
manded the men~ot-war~ Although the Dutch had four times 
as many seamen to draw on as a reserve supply for·their 
warships, they were less well paid and fed worse than their 
English counterparts·. One reason for this was that each 
Dutoh captain was contra-eted to provision his own ship.62 
6oThe bea.khead was· the ornamented prow which served 
as a lavatory for the- crew. John Smith, The Seaman's . 
Grammm= and Dictionar! (London, 1691}, p. 10. .. 
T. Heywood1 A rue Descri tion of His 'Ma esties Ro al Shi Built J.6 at oo witc n ent on on, 37), 
PP• 2 .. • pon exam nat on one gets t e distinct im-
pression that this book was government sponsored propa-
ganda to encourage people to pay their ship-money and to 
show them how well it was being spent. For this reason, 
the figures with regard to the size of the ship may have 
been eomewhat exaggerated. 
t>2Qppenheim, P'• .306. 
Another reason was that the Dutch government gave the men 
only half payf assuming that the men would be eager to 
serve again in order to receive the rest or their pay.63 
The highest paid member of the shipt's crew was the captain, 
who received as much as one hundred thirty guilders a 
month.64 The next ranking officer received around thirty-
six guilders a month. Skilled sailors, such as cooks• 
surgeons, carpenters and gunners~ received between f0£l~­
teen and thirty guilders a montht while the ordinary 
seaman· got around six to eleven guilders per month.65 
While the English sailor's pay scale was about the 
same,,· he almost always received full pay, although not 
as promptly as he would have liked. Skilled sailors re .. 
ceived twenty-tour, shillings a month and ordinary seamen 
were pa.id nineteen a nionth.66 ·In addition to his pay~ 
an English sailor received a share of the prise value of 
a captured Dtttcb.sh1p. At the beginning.of .the war, one-
third of the value ot the prize was divided among the crew, 
except in the ·case of· a captured man•of•war, when they 
were given one-halt the prize and the other halt went to 
the tund ror the sick and wounded sailors and the widows 
and orphans of sailors. While the needs of- the-Treasury 
later caused the government to greatly reduce this gener-
63oardiner.and Atkinson, .III, pp. lO·ll. 
64A Dutch guilder was worth two English shillings. 
Ibid •. 1:5III, . P• 104. · 0 Ibid. · . 
66oppenheim, p. .314. 
19 
osity,. every sailor still received a share of the prize 
and the sick and wounded and the widows and orphans were 
still provided £or.67 
The Dutch sailors' diet consisted mostly of cheese, . 
hard bread and fish, supplemented by meat two days a week 
and butter, salt, vinegar and a little more beer in summer 
than·in winter.68 While the English officers ate better 
than their men, ham in the winter and smoked; meat in the 
summer along with butter, sugar, .white biscuits, oil and 
. . 
mustard-seedf!.common and green cheese, all washed down. 
with French wine, Spanish wine. brandy and good beer; the 
average English seaman had a decidedly better menu than 
the Dutch sailor. There was plenty or bread and meat, 
mostly beef and pork, supplemented by cheese. butter a.nd 
.fish. . This i'are was accompanied by beer that was very 
often bad and had to be replaced by water._ When this 
happened, however,· the men were to be paid two pence a 
day for each day.they had to drink· water instead of beer. 
Although there was.some corruption here and there and 
sometimes insufficient funds.were provided the Victuallers, 
the English sailors were comparatively well-ted.69 
Besides being well-paid and well-fed, the English · 
sailor was wall-clothed. Although he usually was expected 
67 . 9 
68Ibid., p. 30 • 
6 G. ardiner and Atkinson,· I, p. 92 ... 
. 9oppenheim, PP• 325-320. · 
20 
to pay for his own clothes. he was provided with a two· 
pound sum to replace clothes lost in action or shipwreck. 
The clothes the ordinary seaman wore were a canvas jacket 
and canvas drawers, a cotton waistcoat and cotton drawers, 
shirts,· shoes and linen and cotton stockings. 70 
Considering·the medical conditions of the seventeenth 
century, the sick and.wounded were well·taken care ot. A 
man injured in·action continued to draw his pay until his 
recovery or death. In addition-to the hospital space pro-
vided by the,leading ports and London andthe work or such 
eminent physicians as Dr. Daniel Whistler,71. each English 
ship was to be provided with five pounds worth of medical 
supplies ·(al.though rath~r crude at this time - rice, oat-
meal and sugar) per one hundred men every sixmonths.7~ 
·The major reason.that the discipline 0£ the English 
crews was superior to the Dutch73 was that they bad a 
strong, well•enforced legal code.· On December 2.5th• 1652, 
Commons passed thirty-nine Articles or War for the main•· 
tenanoe ot discipline. Thirteen o££enses were listed which 
carried an unconditional death penalty while twelve offenses 
to be punished.by dea~h or lesser.punishment, to be decided 
by a court ot war (court-martial). The trial conditions · 
were relatively fair. ·.The charges were to be heard before 
70tbid., P•. 329.. . · 
7~Garainer and Atkinson, IV, p. 200. ~3oppenheim, p. 321. · Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 218. 
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the. captain and seven officers of the ship in \ihich the 
crime was committed •. · Then the· accused was only to.be: tried 
in the· presence of flag ·officers and no ·finding.involving 
loss :of life· or limb ·was to be carried 'OUt without· the · 
approval of the senior officer in command. Thus a prisoner 
had a fairly good:·chance of getting an impartial triai.71+ · 
· As in· any .war, the officers received most ·or the. 
attention; therefore, some mention o:C them should·be made 
here•· The English admirals had received little previous ·· 
experience on the water;·however, the majority of them .had 
held oommands;:in the ·army during the civil war. The most 
famous of the English "generals at sea" ·were Blake, Deane, 
Ayscu:e, Penn and Monck,·75 From the start, Blake assumed 
the leadership or the navy and, while' he was rio·Cromwell 
or.Nelson, he was bold and inspiring with the ability to 
do the best with what he had.· Monck, ·who assumed co~ 
ieadership of the fleet.when Blake 'Was wounded,, was es-
sentially a land-commander who·proved himself a very ca• 
pable sea-commander in the latter part of this war (and 
even more so in.the second·war). The Dutch naval leaders, 
Tromp.: Dewith, De Ruyter; Evertson and Floritz, ·had spent 
more.time on the sea than their English opposites; in fact, 
Tromp had served as a cabin-boy on his father•s ship~76, 
· ?~ppenheim, pp. 311·312. · · · · · 
76oardiner; Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, p. 136. Dixon, p. 217. ' ' ' 
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While Dewith was brave to the point of rashness, he lost 
his salt control when confronted by lack of disoipline.77 
Tromp, on the other hand, was an able strategist, a skill-
ful tactician and considered the best seaman on either 
side.78 
Mention has been made 0£ the contribution ot the Eng-
lish administrative machinery towards the English victory, 
but there has been no attempt to define and describe this 
organization. Naval administration was largely in. the 
hands of the Admiralty Committee of the Council of State 
and the Commissioners of the Navy. While there was another 
committee, the Committee of the Merchants ot the Navy and 
Customs, this body took no real part in naval administra-
tion and was dissolved in 1654. The Admiralty Committee . · 
met daily during the war·and, theoretically, had control 
over the Commissioners or the Navy, but, because the 
Commissioners were comprised of more experienced per-
sonnel, it was practically allowed.to control administra-
tive affairs. 
The duties of the Admiralty Committee and the Com-
missioners of the Navy were to supervise the building, 
. repairing and titting out of ships, the purchase and di·s-· 
tribution of stores, the control of the dockyards and the 
?~Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, p. 136. 
7 Marcus, p. 146. 
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maintenance of discipline.79 The degree to which these 
duties were carried out can be seen with respect to the 
building or new ships by comparing warship production 
during the reign or Charles I and during the Commonwealth .• 
During Charlest reign, if one or two ships were construct-
ed in one year, this event was greeted with great re-
joicing• During .the Commonwealth, man-of-war were turned 
out at the rate ot ten a year on the average with the peak 
production or twenty-two warships in-1654. All this would 
not have been possible, however, without the greater rev-
enues provided by Parliament. Where Charles I had ~een 
able to raise only one million pounds a year, Parliament 
raised an average or two million pounds a· year with a 
maximum annual expenditure approaching three million· pounds 
in 16;2-16;3.SO 
Along with the problem of building ships, the Admiralty 
had to see that they were armed and fitted out. Practically 
. the only home source of new cannons was George Bourne, who 
had been the Royal Gun.founder. Since the output of his works 
was inadequate to meet the demands brought on by war, guns 
were obtained by disarming inland forts, taking guns .f'rom 
captured merchant ships and men-of-wa~, importing cannons 
from abroad and expanding the home gun-.founding industry.8l 
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Before the war, both nations imported naval stores (masts, 
hemp, pitch, tar, etc.) from the Baltic states; however,· 
the Dutch were able very early in the war to persuade the 
King of Denmark to close the straits to English shipping,. 
forcing the English to look elsewhere for naval stores.82 
This need was filled by obtaining masts, hemp, pitch and 
tar from New England, SootlandS.3 and captured· Dutch ships.84 
The English ships were then fitted out at the major ports, 
Harwich, Plymouth, ·Chatham, Wool~witoh., Deptford and Ports-. 
mouth.85 
As it has been indicated, the Dutch objective, indeed 
their only hope, was to seek an engagement with the entire 
English fleet and.knock it out in one battle.86 The English 
objective was to attack and cripple Dutch commerce; it was 
not at this time considered the primary duty of an English 
·navy to destroy the enemy's fleet in preparation for a land 
invasion.87 In fact, this was unnecessary since the Dutch 
relied on their mercnant fleet for their existance.88 , 
After the first conflict on May 19, 1652, both navies 
put into their home ports to refit, but the English, be-
cause they I:tad suffe~ed less, were ready to sail sooner· 
~~Gardiner and Atkinson, III, P• ,369. 
g Ibid.~ V, P• 216. 
8'+Ibid., III, PP• 1-2. 8~0ppenheim, p. ·36). d Wilson, P• 06. 
0 7Gardiner and Atkinson, I, p. 299. 
88aardiner• Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, PP• 
121-1220 
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than the Dutch. On Juno 20, Blake was given instructions 
to sail to the North Sea and seize the homeward bound Dutch 
East Indies fleet, to scatter and destroy the Dutch fishing 
fleet and, if the .first two objectives were ·carried out 
successfully, to disrupt the Dutch Baltic trade. 89 He.· set 
sail after the 24th of June90 and, by July ll, was within 
sight of the Dutch fishing fleet. , Before proceeding fur-
ther, he issued orders to Penn and his other officers to 
attack only the Dutch men-of-war guarding the fishing 
boats.91 Meanwhile the Dutch fleet under Tromp had set 
out in pursuit, but, because of the unco-operative wind, 
Tromp decided on the 14th of July to attack Ayscue's 
smaller fleet anchored in the·Downs. He tried to enter. 
the Downs, but was hampered fir~st by calms and then by. 
gales and on the 22nd, the wind shifted causing him to 
change his mind again and pursue hS.s primary objective, 
Blake. 
In spite of its capriciousness, the weather was not 
Tromp's only problem; he was running short of supplies. 
He had a fleet of ov~r ninety ships, the crews or which 
consumed food at the rate or over sixty thousand pounds 
of hard bread, three hundred fifty to four -hundred twenty 
barrels of beer and three hundred fifty to four hundred 
~gaardiner and Atkinson, I, p. )Ol. 
91Ibid., I, P• 313. . Powell, . p. 168. 
twenty barrels of .water a week. This problem was further 
increased by the fact that a supply fleet would have a 
difficult time finding him without an appointed meeting 
place and time. Because he was pursuing the English fleet 
and did not know where he would be at a given time, he 
could not establish an appointed rondezvous.92 
Ayscue, with only twenty ships,93 was indeed fortunate 
that the wind changed. In his report, he attributed this 
good fortune to the will 0£ God: "They thought to have 
performed wonders upon our fleet here in the absence or 
General Blake, but the Lord was pleased to disappoint them 
and to bring to nought their counsela.n94 Meanwhile Blake's · 
fleet met the Dutch fishing guard on July 12 and captured 
twelve Dutch men-of-war or between twenty and thirty guns 
each; however, three had been so badly damaged in the battle 
that they had to be sunk.95 
In spite of the fact that his ships were running very 
low on provisions and scurvey had broken out, Tromp con-
tinued the pursuit and,.by August 4,.he was within sight 
of Blake's fleet. Tromp was on the verge of attacking 
when a severe.storm broke up his fleet and forced the Dutch 
ships to head for home.96 Considering his lack of pro-
~~Gardiner·and Atkinson, I, pp. 3.38-368. 
Ibid.; I, P• 369. 
941bid1., I, P• 374. ~~Ibid., I, PP• 383-385. 
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visions, the outbreak or scurvey and the ease with which 
the English fleet defeated the Dutch gl1ard, this wind mny 
have been a blessing in di~ise for Tromp. 
While Tromp was pursuing Blake in the North Sea, the-
Admiralty Board of Amsterdam sent \iord to the States Gen-
eral on July 25 that the silver fleet at Cadiz needed an 
escort home. The value of the silver aboard this fleet 
was put at between.fifteen and sixteen million guilders 
(this fj.gure can be better appreciated when it is known 
that it cost the Dutch one million four hundred thousand 
guilders to maintain a fleet of thirty-five sail in the 
Mediterranean Sea £or one year}. On the 27th, word was 
sent to the silver fleet that it should set sail because 
there would be a fleet in the channel waiting to escort 
it home. On the 29th De Ruyter was put in command of this 
fleet and plans were· made to rendezvous with the silver 
fleet. By August 3, the Dutch plans were for De Ruyter 
to escort an outward bound convoy through· the channel and 
then, leaving two men-of-war to continue with the convoy. 
to cruise in the.channel and watch for the fleet from Spain. 
If by any chance he should meet the silver fleet before the 
meroha.nt fleet was entirely out of' the channel, De Ruyter's 
orders were to immediately abandon the outgoing fleet, with 
the exception of the two men-of-war, and bring in the sil-
ver fleet.97 
97Ib1d., II, pp. l~-45. 
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By August 14, Ayscue's fleet in the Downs had in. 
creased· to over £orty sail, whereas De Ruyter'a fleet con-
s~sted or only a little over twenty ships until the 21st. 
when sixty ships were added to his fleet. Despite the 
·arrival of. these ships, ·De Ruyter' s fleet was not as 
strong as it would. 'appear, for, aa De Ruyter reported, 
the majority or these ships were of poor. quality and ill· 
equipped with insufficient crews and provisions for only 
two months. Nevertheless, he was able.to get between 
fifty-five and sixty or them in shape and on the 26th of 
Augus·t he was escorting a merchant fleet of twenty-five. 
ships when he was attacked by Ayscue. Of De Ruyter's 
fleet, twenty-five were capital ships, while only twelve 
of the forty or more English ships were of that size. 
The Dutch claimed that the English lost three of their · 
best ships in the fighting and that only the wind, which 
allowed the English to escape because of its timely shift 
in ·direction, prevented their complete destru~ction. On 
the other side, the Englj.sh claimed the.Dutch lost ~hrea 
of their beat ships and three others were so badly battered 
as to be near sinking._98 It appears that the battle was 
little more than a draw with the ·nutch the victors, since 
it was the English who broke off the action and declined 
to tight the next day.99 It also appears that, since the 
§~Ibid.; I
11
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Dutch were not in the habit of escorting such a small mer-
chant fleet with such a large number or warships, the Eng-
lish had fallen for a trap. 
· After his failure to prevent the English from destrroy• 
1ng the Dutch fishing fleet, Tromp was replaced in command 
of the Dutch navy by Dewith.100 By the 30th of September, 
Dewith had convoyed the merchantmen out of the channel and 
made contact with the silver fleet, bringing it into port 
on the 4th or Ootober.lOl On October 8, Dewith's fleet of 
about sixty sail was cruising alone in the channel when it 
was spotted by an English fleet of more than sixty sail. 
_This battle, known as the Battle of the Kentish Knock, was 
decidedly an English victory. Blake's fleet reported sink-
. ing three Dutch capital ships in excess 0£ forty guns and 
capturing three other capital ships. The English loss was 
put at one man-of •war and two merchant ships damaged badly 
enough that they had to put into port in danger of sinking.102 
The English considered this such a deo~sive victory that 
they decided to send thirty ships to relieve their hard-
press ed Mediterranean fleet. 103 The English had £irst ap-
peared in strength in the Mediterranean Sea in 1650 when 
Blake was in pursuit or Rupert. Since that -time a new turn 
or English naval policy had taken place. The previously 
unprotected Levant trade was now organized into a regular 
ig~Ibid., II, P• 223. !S!a., II• pp. 252-260. 
102fS1a., II, pp. 268-291. 
l03fbid., III, P• 61. 
L -
30 
convoy system because the task of trade protection was now 
regarded as one of the first duties of the English ,.navy •104 
The Mediterranean phase of the first Anglo-Dutch war 
was almost- a forgotten story, but it deserves some mention. 
here, not only because· it was part or the larger action, 
but because this was practically the only time and place 
in English naval history that the English were completely· 
driven off the seaa.105 One reason tor the English defeat 
in the Mediterranean was that when the war broke out the 
Dutch fleet was united at Toulon, while part of the English 
fleet was at Leghorn and part was at Smyrna~ Another reason 
was that the English commander at Leghorn, Appleton, was 
unenterprising and incompetent, whereas the Dutch were com-
manded by the very capable Van Galen. Even so, the English, 
under the command of the captain of the Smyrna fleet, Badiley, 
might have been able to make up for Appleton's blunders, had 
it not been £or the fact that the Dutch·gave their Mediter-
ranean fleet full support, whereas the English gave no thought 
to their fleet in the Mediterranean until flushed with success 
after the Battle of the Kentish Knock. Because o.f' this sup-
port, the Dutch, who o~ly outnumbered the English by fi£teen 
to twelve at the start of the war, grew to over thirty-three 
sail, while the English grew to a divided force of twenty 
104~tarcus, I, P• 136• 
105Jul1an s. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean (New 
York, 1904), Vol. I, p. 207. 
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sail. 
The reason the English continued to remain divided 
was that Appleton did not take advantage or the chance to 
leave Leghorn at the start of the war, allowing Van Galen 
plenty of time to blockade him. Another cause of the even-
tual defeat was the necessity of having to rely on neutral 
ports. The Duke of Tuscany felt the English had overstayed 
their welcome and told Appleton to leave. While Appleton 
might have been able to join Badiley, who was waiting just 
ofr Leghorn, he hesitated too long and was crushed by Van 
Galen. Because or the loss of this naval battle in late 
February of 1653 and because of the overwhelming Dutch 
superiority in the Mediterranean, Badiley was forced to 
head for home. About the only compensation the English 
had was that Van Galen died or wounds received in the 
battle.106 
After Dewith's defeat at the Kentish Knock, he was 
relieved of' oommand·o£ the navy and replaced by Tromp.107 
Tromp's general orders were given in a resolution or the 
States General or October 19t 1652: 
It is understood that it is the first and 
principle object of the State to do all 
possible harm to the English fleet -to be 
sent out, and for that end a sufficient 
body of ships is to be kept together, 
in order that they may put to ·sea abou~ 
Nov. l, to the damage and offence or the 
English tleer68and also to give convoy to the west. · · · · 
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In this proclamation can. be seen one or the major oausef! 
of the Dutch defeat in the first war. . It is not enough 
that Tromp was supposed to engage and destroy the English 
fleet; he constantly had to provide convoy escorts to the 
large Dutch merchant fleet. 
While on escort duty, Tromp, with a fleet or over 
ninety men-of-war escorting three hundred merchantmen, 
met Blake's fleet of just over forty ships on December 
12. In the battle that followed, twenty English vessels, 
whom Blake later termed "merchant freebooters",_ did not 
engage ~nd the English were badly beaten. Like a true 
Purit~nt Blake wrote to the Ad.mir~lty Committee: "I pre-
sume your Honours long for an account or what hath passed 
between us and the Dutch £leet, and I hope you have hearts 
prepared to receive evil as well as good from the hand ot 
God.n109 Once again, the English gained the wind and were 
abl~ to retreat,110 but this battle, known as the Battle 
ot Dungeness, was such a complete Dutch victory that Tromp 
was thinking of. sailing up the Thames after Blake. Luckily 
for the English, Tromp did not have the pilots to negotiate 
t8~aa~d.iner and Atk1nson1 III, p. 23. 
110Ibid., IIIt pp .. 91-lOts. !bid., III, p. 252. 
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the shallow waters and gave up the idea.lll The degree 
to which the Dutch controlled the sea at this time can be 
illustrated by the fact that lighthouses were issued in-
structions in late December of 1652 and early January of . 
1653 t~lling them how and when to light so that the Dutch 
would not be able to use their light.112 
While this was the high water mark of the Dutch navy 
in this first war, Blake was working hard to repair his 
fleet and make it ready to sail in February. The fleet 
sent to help Badiley in the Mediterranean was recalled 
and by February, Blake had seventy-three State's Ships and 
thirty merchant ships ready to sai1.llJ On the 20th, he 
left the Thames in search of Tromp. At this time, Tromp, 
with a fleet of seventy ships had escorted an outward bound 
convoy and was in the process of bringing in a convoy or 
three hundred merchantmen when he was met by Blake's entire 
fleet. The Dutch merchant fleet was in the van and had 
slipped past the English.£leet,.thus, the three day Battle 
ot Portland, beginning on February 28, was fought between 
the English fleet and the Dutch rearguard. Even so, it 
was a tremendous English victory. Eleven Dutch warships 
were sunk or burned ~nd six capital ships 0£ around forty 
guns each were captured along with around fifty merchantmen. 
if~Ibid.;-III, PP• 154-156. 
113tbid., III, P• 30J. Ibid., III, p. 335. 
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The Dutch considered the damage to their fleet to be so 
serious that they called home fourteen ships of their 
Mediterranean fleet.114 The Battle of Portland cleared 
the English Channel of Dutch shipping. forcing the mer-
chantmen to use the northern route around Scotland. For 
this reason, Por_tland can be considered the Turning Point 
of the war tor the English. 
In addition to being forced to put into port to make 
repairs and refit, the English fleet suffered· a blow in 
the form or Blake's injury.115 He had been wounded above 
the left knee which was not serious, but he caught a bad 
cold after going ashore.116 ·He took a turn for the worse 
and, for a while, it was felt that he would never be able 
to go to sea again~117. 
Along with Blake, the English had a large number or 
sick and wounded and were greatly in need of men. As Penn 
wrote to the A~miralty Committee on April 13: "A great part 
0£ the fleet is but a short time victualled, severalthave 
foul bottoms and other defects which will call tor sudden 
repair; our want 0£ men is much and universal, especially 
in the bigger ships, who in time of service will most re-
quir~ them.nalS The· English were in such a need of men 
~:i;Ibid.; IV, .PP• 30-229. 
116Ibfd •• ; IV, pp. 78 .. $4. 
11 ?!b~CI •• ; IV,, P• 229. 
llgibid., IV, P• 32;. ?Era., IV, P• 29a. 
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that they were not only getting soldiers to serve on ship.-
board, but there was such a large number of soldiers that 
it was feared ther~ would not be enough sailors to show the 
soldiers what to do.119 
While tha Dutch had been ~urt more than the English in 
the .last battle, both fleets were ready to sail aga:i.n at 
about the same time.120 Led by Monck and Doane in the 
brand new eighty-e:tght eun "Resolution", the English put 
to sea and on_ June 12, 1653 they eneaged the Dutch fleet 
off the Gabbard. Tha two fleets met about eleven in the 
morning and fought until nightfall when they drifted apart. 
The next day, the battle was renewed again at about eleven 
o'clock. This day's battle lasted until after sunset when 
the Dutch sought refuge in shallow water and the English 
fleet broke off the action and rercrmed. This English . 
victory was even greater than the last because, while only 
about twenty Dutch ships were sunk, destroyed or taken, 
the English fleet was so little hurt that it was able to 
keep the se~ and blockade the Dutch coast.121 The only 
major English loss in the Battle or the Gabbard122 was 
Deane who was killed in the heat of battle, cut in two 
by a cannon shot.123 
i~6Ibfd·~ IV, P• 253. 
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The English were now the undis.put.ed masters of the 
sea,. able to harass Dutch merchantmen· and,fishing boats 
at will. Also, the blockade of the Dutch coast, carried 
out by a fleet of one hundrad tan sai1,l24 had a disaster-
. 125 
ous effect on the Dutch economy. The price of: corn, 
which had been at thirteen shillings a bushel in 1652, 
rose f'our pounds attar the defeat off the Gabbard and was 
expected to rise even higher if the blockade were not 
lifted.126 Trading was dead, money was scarce and people 
were eating old pickled herring127 and longing .fot.. the 
old days of wealth and plenty.12g Also at this time, 
there was a strong desire £or peace in the Netherlands, 
especially in Holland.129 
Much of the suffering 0£ the Dutch people was due 
to the alarming rate at which English warships captured 
Dutch merchantmen. At the very start of the war, many 
homecoming Dutch merchantmen were eaai.ly picked up be-
cause they did not know of the war. After this initial 
success, captures declined, but, in the Letters and Papers 
relating to th~,[irst Dutch W~r, ona constantly reads about 
English ships bringing in Dutch merchantmen, often laden 
with valuable cargos. Even when English .forttines were at 
t~;Gardiner·and Atkinson, V, p. 118. 
I25Ib;4•i Ii p. 375. 
Ibid,.; V; p. 119. i~~Ioid.; v, pp. 200-201~ 
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their lowest, during the Battle of Dungeness, an English 
.. 
frigate not in Blake's fleet.brought in two .Dutch mer-
chantmen captured while homeward bound from Spain with 
cargos of oil, wineJ hides. silver, tobacco and salt.1.30 
In all, the English captured between eleven and fifteen 
hundred Dutch merchant ships during the first war,131 a 
heavy blow to the Dutch economy. 
At this point, something should be said about the 
relative mat~rity of the two navies. One evidence of 
this maturity was the fact that battles were no longer 
as confused as in earlier naval engagements due to the 
tactics of fj~ghting in line ahead formation.132 ~1'11ile 
there is ·considerable dispute as to whether the Dutch or 
the English originated this battle formation and as to 
exactly whon it was first used, the English, as can be 
seen in the last three battles of the war, used it with 
greatest effect. The first official recognition that 
has been found of the line as a naval tactic is con-
tained in the Commonwealth Orders of 165J: 
••• All the ships or every squadron shall 
endeavor to keep in a line with their 
chief unless the chief be maimed or other-
wise disabled (which God forbidt), whereby 
the said ship that wears the flag should 
not come in· to do the service that is 
. . 
mibid., III, ·p. 102 • 
.. CJppenheim 1 p.. 307 .• 132oardiner ~nd Atkinson, V, pp. 168-169. 
requisite. Then every ship of said squad• 
~on shall endeavor to keep in a line with 
the.Admiral or he that commands in chl!f 
next unto him, and nearest the enemy. ) 
Another evidence or the maturity of the two navies, par-
ticularly of the English, was· the development during the 
war of two distinct types of ·warships - the large capital 
ship with firepower designed to smother the enemy in a 
pitched battle and the commerce raider, a light, nimble 
and swift frigate, able to prey on enemy trade at sea.134 
Meanwhile the pressure or Monckts blockade made the 
Dutch anxious to get out to sea as soon as possible; how• 
ever, it took eight weeks tor Tromp to repair the damages 
done to his fleet in the last battle.135 During this time 
he was able to collect around one hundred ships, of which 
he wrote: " ••• a good thirty of these ought to be struck 
oft the list it better ones could be had in their place."136 
While Tromp was collecting his fleet, Monck left a 
screen of warships and took the major part of the fleet 
home to Sole Bay on July 15 to be cleaned and reprovisioned.137 
The amazing thing, is that while Monck was gone, Tromp had 
no idea of his absence.138 By August, Blake was said to be 
recovering enough to be able to get back to sea shortly; 
l33Julian S.·Corbett (Ed.) 1 Fighting Instructions, l!jJ0-1816 (London, 1905), p. lOv. - · 
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however, .Monck was still in command and by August 5, he 
was back blockading the Dutch coast with his entire fleet 
of .over one hundred ten saii.l.39 
On August S, Tromp appeared with over one hundred 
ahips. His plan was to drawMonck away so that Dewith, 
. . 
with some twenty•five sail, would be able to get to sea 
and hopefully join Tromp. Monck fell;for the bait and 
chased Tromp, fiMting a brisk, four hour battle which 
' -- . .' 
ended with the English still having.the wind; however, 
that night Tromp tacked northward and slipped past the 
Engli.sh fleet. The next day was stormy, but on the 10th 
ot August, Tromp, joined by Dewithts fleet, gained the 
wind and bore down on the English. In the ensueing con-
flict, th~ tw9. fleets .Passed through each other• s line .. 
tour times, the fourth being the occasion or the heaviest 
fighting. As Monck wrote later, two Dutch flagships came 
tP·· to the ttResolutiontt, "at which time the very heavens 
were obscured by smo~e, the air rent with the thundering 
noisel the sea all in a breach with the shot that fell, 
the ships even trembling and we hearing everywhere mes-
sengers of .;peath flying.ttl40 When the Dutch fleet broke· 
.. . 
oft the action, they had lost about fourteen ships sunk 
139 ' . 140Ibt~·;. Vv,,· P• 3326a~ Ib ., P• o. 
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or burnt and Tromp killed by a musket shot.141 · The Eng- · 
lish raeet was greatly damaged in its masts and rigging 
and had to put into port.142 
After the defeat of their last attempt to destroy 
the English fleet in,pitched battle and the death of Tromp, 
the Dutch peace efforts, which had been in operation since 
after the first conflict,143 were stepped up. Although 
the Dutahwere able to continuQ naval operations after the 
Battle 0£ the Texel, as evidenced by Dewith's escorting 
three hundred forty merchant ships with forty-three war-
ships around the northern route in September of 16.53,144 
the strength ot their fleet was greatly reduced. The 
Dutch people were in favor of peace as early as November 
of 16;2145 and Dutch envoys had been sent asking £or peace 
on July 3, 1653 shortly after the Battle ot the Gabbard.146 
Although the war dragged on after the Battle of the Texel, 
there were no more major battles and the misery and pri-
vations brought on by continued con£11et and restriction 
of trade produced a desire for peace which resulted in the 
Treaty of Westminster, May 1, 16;4.147 
At this first treaty of Westminster; the English made 
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the harsh ·demands of the victor and the Dutch had to tone 
tham down. Cromwell wanted an annual sum from the Dutch 
for the right to fish in English waters, compensation for 
the Massacre of Amboina, punishment or the officials re•. 
sponsible for it, a limit on the number or Dutch warships 
in English waters, striking of the flag whenever meeting 
English ships and the right of search. While these de-
mands were pretty severe, the blockbuster was Cromwell's 
desire that the Prince of Orange would never succede to 
any of the offices and dignities held by his ancestors 
and that he should never be appointed to military command. 
De Witt realized that he could never get the Dutch 
·people to agree to any of these demands, especially since 
it meant allowing a foreign power to interfere in her in-
ternal affairs. For this reason, De Witt prepared to 
strengthen and continue the war effort. But Cromwell's 
desire tor peace was genuine and he conceded on minor 
points and even said he would be content to allow the ex-
clusion ot the Prince ot Orange to be included in a secret 
article. De Witt knew the Dutch would not even stand for 
this, so he entered into clandestine negotiations with 
Cromwell through the leading Dutch envoy, De Witt's· per• 
sonal friend, VanBeverningh •. When told of the Dutch popu• 
lar feeling on this .point, Cromwell agreed to be satisfied 
1£ the Estates 0£ Holland alone affirmed a declaration that 
the Prince of Orange be excluded. In achieving this highly 
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delicate diplomatic objective De Witt proved himself a 
_e "148 master of the «art of diplomatic chicanery and intrigu·~ 
The. Dutch agreed in the open treaty to pay compensation for 
the Amboyna massacre 0£ 162.3, · to acqui.eace in regards to . 
the Navigation Act,. to make annual payment for the right 
of fishing in English waters and to reoogni~e the English 
right of the f'lag.149 
. , 148oeorge Edmundson, Historx of. Hollan~ {Cambridge, 
1922)., pp. 220•222. For a further account or the f'asci- · 
na.tine story of De Witt's diplomatic maneuvers, see Ibid., 
PP• 2f 2•224. . · .. 4~Iarcus, I, P• 147~ 
Chapter II 
The Second Anglo-Dutch War 
The termination of the first Dutch war allowed Eng-
land to resume her interrupted policy in the Mediterranean 
Sea. Immediately after the peace with Holland the advan-
tage in the Mediterranean shifted back and forth; it was 
becoming clear that the power that achieved supremacy in 
this area would be the controlling force in Europe. With 
respect to the Mediterranean there were three clear leading 
motives in the maze of mystery that was Oliver Cromwell's 
foreign policy: (l) It was Cromwell's mission to become 
the leader or a great protestant coalition to finally halt 
the counter-reformation. (2) The Elizabethan war against 
Spain and alliance with France was to be revived with the 
objective of opening the New World to British trade and 
withdrawing British subjects from the jurisdiction of the 
Inquisition in Spanish ports. (J) Vengeance was to be 
taken.for insults heaped on .England since she became a 
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republic.l 
Before war started with Spain, the greater part of 
tha English fleet was sent into the Mediterranean Sea as 
a show of force. Like Nelson. Blake perceived the policy 
of his superiors and dared to show them how it could be 
carried out. "So it is we see him, full of the love of 
God and his.country, raging round the Mediterranean to 
seek a foeman wort1lf o£ the weapon he has tempered, and 
finding none."2 It was during this cruise th~t the English 
navy wrote another.chapter in the progress ot naval science. 
Blake's destruction of the Turkish fortress at Tunis was 
the ·r1rst time that a fleet of ships had anchored close.· 
under powerful batteries and crushed them by firepower 
alone.3 
Except for the continued employment given to the 
sailors of the gnglish navy in a victorious naval war 
'(highlighted by Blake's destruction.of the Spanish fleet 
at Santa Grus, April 20, 1657); the Spanish War of 1655• 
1660 was a failure. The only benefit of the one military 
fiasco of Cromwell's life, the so•called •western design•. 
was the acquisition or Jamaica, a weak point in the Span• 
iard's Carribean line of defense to which ·the English 
~Corbett, England in t~~ Mediterranean, I, pp. 270·272. 
Ibid., P• 3 0. 
3!b1d., P• 307. 
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retreated on being repulsed from their primnry objective, 
San Domin80• . While the English were successi\.il in ta.king 
Dunkirk from the Spanish, with French help, this bloody 
victory was indecisive in promoting the protestant cause· 
against the Catholic (in fact, an alliance with Catholic 
France was used in taking Dunkirk). While England main-
tained a .fleet, in the Mediterranean Sea throughout the 
war and was well on the way to becoming the dominant power 
in that area,4 English commerce suffered heavily from Span~ 
ish privateers, losing almost as many ships as they had 
taken:from the Dutch in the first Anglo-Dutch war (Eng-
land lost an estimated between one thousand and eighteen 
hundred ships to the Spaniah).5 England emerged from the 
Spanish war, which was ended at the Restoration of Charles 
II, with a victorious navy, but a depleted merchant fleet.6 
During the Spanish war and immediately after there 
were many minor incidents that could have led to war between 
England and the Netherlands. The very fact that the two 
nations did not go to war.at this time "was the first and 
moat remarkable proof that neither conflicting economic 
ambitions nor the problems of neutral rights need necessar• 
ily lead to war if those· who held power exercised prudence 
and restraint."? In April or 1662, De Witt allowed the 
4a. M. Trevelyan, England under the Stuarts (New York, 
1904)• PP• 308·311. 
. ;;1Davis, p. 51. · . 
6Ib1d.,·p. 316. 
7Wi!aon, pp. 80-g1. 
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English to arrest several regicides (Okey, Barkstead 
and Corbet} ·and send them to England for execution. This 
was a move designed to smoothe relations between monarch· 
iat England and republican Holland, and, while ·the Dutch· 
still distrusted the·· English· enough to enter into a de-
fensive alliance with France {On April 27, 1662, the French 
and Dutch p~omised to aid each other in a European war pro-
vided the other was not an aggressor.), the English and 
Dutch agreed, in another Treaty of Westminster, September 
l~,· 1662, to aid each other against their rebels.a 
Because the English navy was neglected immedi~tely 
after the death of Oliver Cromwel19 and because of the. 
failure or the Spanish War, there was a belief among·his-
torians that Cromwell had no influenae on English history 
in the field of foreign affairs. and that nothing survived 
him. In his work, England in the Mediterraneal'\, J. s. 
Corbett holds this belief to be false: 
In all that concerned the.British attitude 
to the outside world he changed much and 
left much behind him. He £ound his country 
impotent and neglected in the councils 0£ 
h1urope, and taught her how to speak with 
a commanding voice. He gave her, in the 
first place,, the instrument - a perfected 
navy in the true modern sense - a navy of 
war ships wholly independent of merchant 
. auxiliaries - a thing which had never yet 
been seen in modern times. It was a stride 
Bogg, I, p.·247. 
9p. J. Blok; ffj.storv · or the People ot the Netherlands (New York, 1907), Vo1. I~, p. JI?. . 
as great as that which Drake and his fel-
lows made when they pertected a sailing 
navy, and the results for England.were 
no.less invigorating. But Cromwell gave 
still more~ He gave.the sentiment for 
using the instrument. For he bequeathed 
to the restored monarchy a definite naval 
policy in the Mediterranean and an inde-
structible ambition0ror what we now call imperial politics.! · 
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The fighting ships or the Restoration navy were pro-
vided with skilled personnel and training in seamanship 
by the great trading companies, most notably the East India 
Company, the Newfoundland fisheries and the fleets ot New• 
castle colliers. Three alms houses were maintained for old 
seamen and widows and children or seamen by Trinity House, 
a corporatioi:i rounded in the reign or Henry VIII to assess 
rates for pilotage, appoint fit pilots a~~ to·maintain lights 
on the coast, buoys, beacons, etc.ll Under the later Stuarts 
there was specialization in material and personnel and the 
Navy was more definitely dissociated from the Mercantile 
)18.rin~. No one could fly the Union Jack without a license 
from the Lord ·High Admiral; merchant captains could only 
f'ly the red ensiBn• His Majesty's stores were marked with 
the broad arrow and all ro~es used by the Royal Navy were 
distingtiished by a white strand in order to aid in detection 
when stolen.12 
i~Oorbett, E1'gland in the Mediterranean,.II, pp. 1-2. 
Ogg, l, P• 254. in wartime al! the buoys were taken 
in so that an enemy could not navigate English.waters. J. 
R. Tanner (Ed.), Samuel Pepys' Naval Minutes (London, 1926), 
P• 44 · · . 
12ogg, l, P• 269. 
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Life on board a Stuart warship was more informal than 
one would expect; an "immoderate number or healths were 
drunkff, great quantities or ammunition were wasted in sa-
lutes on the flimsiest pretext, and women friends of the· 
crew were allowed on board and sometimes remained aboard 
ship for extended periods 0£ time. Pay for sailors at the 
end of the reign of Charles II was only slightly higher 
than during the first Dutch war. A fleet vice-admiral was 
paid fifty shillings a day, while a captain of a first rate 
received twenty-one pounds a month and the captain ot a 
sixth rate collected seven ·pounds a month.. The lieutenant 
received between tour pounds four shillings and two pounds 
sixteen shillings a month;' the master between seven and 
four pounds a month and the boatswain slightly less than 
the lieutenant. The gunner, purser and carpenter received 
four pounds a month, while the surgeon and cook were paid 
two pounds ten shillings and one pound five shillings• 
respectively. The able-bodied seaman and the ordinary 
seaman received the same as they did in the l650's, while 
a ship's boy was paid nine shillings sixpence a month.13 
One often reads, in the contemporary accounts of the 
period and in secondary accounts, or the difficulty the 
navy had in recruiting sailors. The main reason for this, 
aside ·rrom the fact ·that a ·man's chances of losing his lite 
13Ibid., P• 27;. 
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in the Royal Navy were greater, was th~t a sailor could . 
get higher wages . ·serving in an English merchant ship. 
Wages for merchant seamen rose during wartime and fell 
during peace (the exception to this rule was just after 
the London fire when great numbers or experienced seamen 
were needed to bring in the timbe:r needed to rebuild the 
city.). During the .first Dutch war, the. wages of merchant 
sailors were between thirty and.thirty-eight shillings a 
month. After this war, they fell to between.twenty-three 
and twenty-four shillings and then climbed back up to 
between thirty and thirty-eight during th~ Spanish War. 
After 1660, the .wages or merchant seamen £ell to twenty 
shillings or less, but du~ing the Second Dutch War they 
reached between thirty-five and thirty-eight a month. 
Once again wages for merchant seamen fell when the need 
for' them was not as· great, but this time not· as lotti, 
only to between twenty-seven and thirty shillings a month. 
During the last.Dutch war, a merchant seaman could earn 
b~tween thirty-five and forty shillings a month.14 
Another condition in the lite of the Stuart seaman 
was the punishment meted out to minor offenders. By our 
standards, this punishment alone would seem to be enough 
to cause a sailor in the Royal_Navy to seek employment 
elsewhere, but by .seventeenth century standards the pun-
14navis, p~ 1)5. 
ishment was relatively lenient.15 Minor offences were 
punished thusly: 
l. For swearing and· drunkenness, forfeiture 
or one day's pay. 
2. For· telling a lie, able-bodied seamen' 
and inferior ratings were to be hoisted on 
the main-stay, having a broom and shovel 
tied to their backs, and to remain in this 
posture tor half an hour; while the ship's 
company cried out 'A liar, A liar'. 
For ratings above that of able-bodied sea• 
men forfeiture or one day's pay. 
3• For ·theft, the culprit to be towed ashore, 
and the amount made good out or his wages. 
4. For going ashore without leave, forfeiture 
of two days• pay. 
5. Neglect of watch, forfeiture or one day's 
pay. . 
o. Defiling the decks, not-more than twelve 
lashes.16 
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The period 0£ the later Stuarts was one of the most 
formative in English naval history because ot the steady 
improvement in administration and the accumulation of a 
vast fund ot experience in the hard struggles with the 
Dutch. Between 1660 and 167.3 there were added to the one 
hundred fifty-six ships in existence in 1660 a total or 
one hundred forty-seven vessels, an .increase of sixty 
thousand tons, twenty thousand men and four thousand guns. 
Losses incurred in the Dutch Wars were more than made 
good.17 
In line with most of the restoration settlement, the 
i~Ogg, I, P• 275. 
17Ibid., PP• 274-275. Ibi<r:, P• 280. 
;1 
existing Admiralty and Navy Commissioners were temporarily 
kept in office and such old parliamentarian officials as 
Penn, _.-Batten and Pater and Phineas Pett ware kept and worked 
harmoniously with Royalists such as Slingsbie, sir George· 
Carteret and Lord Berkeley of Stratton. The only major 
change that occurred at the Restoration was the revival . 
of the office of Lord High Admiral with the Duke of York 
being appointed to £,ill this position.ls 
The Lord High Admiral's principal officers, Carteret 
(treasurer), Slingsbie (controller), Batten (surveyor) and 
Pepys (clerk ot the acts), worked with .the Navy commission-
ers, Berkely, Penn, Peter Pett and William Coventry (ap-
pointed in 1662). The Navy Board, or Lord High Admiral's 
Advisory Council, made contracts; paid ships' companies, · 
regulated rates of pay, selected candidates for commissions 
and supervised dockyards and naval ship-building. The 
Navy Board had summary jurisdiction over seamen committing 
riots on shore and over dockyard employees. The treasurer 
paid estimates and, obtained his funds from the treasury. 
The controller kept duplicate accounts and supervised vic-
tualling. The surveyor kept himself i?Jf ormed of the state 
of ships and dockyards, and the clerk of the acts served as 
secretary and kept minutes.and records. The advantage of 
this system was that it associated the personal initiative 
l8Ibid., PP• 257-258. 
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of a Lord High Admiral such as James, Duke of York, with 
the competence and energy of men like Pepys and Coventry.19 
During the third Dutch war, the Test Act forced James 
to give up his office, so his powers lapsed to Charles II, 
who delegated them to a commission made up or Prince Rupert, 
Shaftesbury, Osborne,. Anglesey, Buckingham, Monmouth and 
Lauderdale - men not distinguished £or maritime service 
(with the exception, of course, of Rupert). Thus there 
was created an Admiralty Board, with no technical knowledge, 
but supreme executive and military functions working with a 
Navy Board.possessing considerable administrative experience, 
. . 
but little or no executive authority. While, in theory, 
these two bodies should have supplemented each other, in 
practice they generally overlapped. However, this defect 
was offset somewhat by the fact that James, in spite of 
his exclusion from office, continued to exercise consider-
able influence throughout the third Dutch war.20 
The chief merit of the Duke of York as an administra-
tor was that he recognized and appreciated ability and 
industry when he saw them and that he used the authority 
of hi-s rank to uphold the best of his subordinates against 
the intrigues.of interested parties. For this reason 
James can claim no first hand credit for the reforms that 
made the British Navy a power in European politics,- but 
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his importance is that he show~d intelligence.in recog• 
nizing the outstanding genius 0£ men such as Pepys and · 
Coventry and.steady loyalty in constantly supporting them.21 
The main difficulty in naval administration of the· 
mid-seventaenth century was lack of money. The English 
legislators did not comprehend the expense or an adequately 
maintained.fleet and especially its increased.cost in time 
of war. The coat 0£ the peace-t.ime Navy at the Restoration 
was four hundred thousand pounds a year and by'l670 it had 
increased to five hundred thousand pounds. This was one-
third. of the total revenue that ·parliament thought necessary 
tor national services. but failed to provide. The first 
two years of the Second Dutqh War cost three million pounds, 
almost all or it spent on naval expenditure •. The conse-
quences of the shortages 0£ money were that the seamen · 
were unpaid, supplies had to be bought high prices (some-
times as high as forty per cent more) because .or the low 
level of government credit and,, due to a dearth of money 
to pay for necessary repairs, some ships had to be put out 
of commission.22 
Recruiting of new seamen, a hard job at best, was 
even more difficult because a sailor's lot·was likely to 
be semi-starvation and extreme poverty. In fact, condi-
tions were so bad for seamen that there were an estimated 
2lp. c. Turner1 James II (New York, 1948), p. 72. 22ogg, I, pp. i!60-262. . ' . 
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three thousand English and Scottish seamen serving in the 
Dutch fleets throughout the last t\\fO Dutch wars._23 The 
food of· the last two Dutch wars was often bad :beer, moldy 
bread and meat from animals wh:tch had died natural deaths,~ 24 
In order to supply the needs of the Royal Navy sailors 
' 
were often impressed from homeward-bound ships, although 
colliers, fishing boats, transports and the barge or the 
Archbishop 0£ Canterbury were theoretically exempt from 
the press. Iv!any seamen were .recruited from the wherries 
(passenger and freight rowboats} of the Thames. The mari• 
time counties we:r'e scoured of men who lociked as if they 
knew something about salt.water. So great was the shortage 
; 
of men during the last two Dutch wars, especially between 
1665 and 1667; that .farmers and teamsters were pressed. 
Those picked up by the press were oi'ten old men, children~ 
or the diseased. ·In the second Dutch war, the shortage 
was so great that sixth rate ships were laid up in order· 
to provide crews for the larger vessels. In the third 
Dutch war, voluntary enlistment was encouraged by giving 
a bounty of six weeks' pay and a certificate, indicating 
that.the sailor had served in the Royal Navy at such and 
such adate.25 Because of the lack of .funds with which 
2JThis was in spite of the fact that they were subject 
to immediate lynching if caught by their former countrymen. 
Ibid. 
. . •. ··24Ibi d. 
25lbid;, pp. 263-264. 
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to pay the seamen, the navy resorted· to a policy of paying 
off ships where the least sum paid off the most men. The 
result was that those who had served least were more likely 
to get paid than those who had served most and needed their 
money more.26 
The gradual elimination of the superiority in tone and 
discipline in the navy which had bean carried over from the 
Commonwealth period has been attributed to nthe corrupting 
influence of· court favor in a licentious government".27 
In fact, it may have been duo to William Coventry that the 
English navy had any capable officers at all. Despite 
considerable opposition, he continued to press for the re-
employment of professional sailors of the interregnum and 
to promote promising officers.28 
In the 1660•a, the Dutch government, while not yet 
gaining full efficiency, had done much to correct some of 
the major causes £or its defeat in its first war with 
England. Before the first Anglo-Dutch war1 'the basically 
unmilitary States General• conservative in money matters• 
had allowed its fleet to degenerate into a mere assembly 
of armed merchantmen, due partly to long and easy victory 
over the decrepit navy of Spain.29 It was largely due to 
the leadership of John De Witt, who only started to attain 
~~Tanner,. .F'efs' Naval Minute~, p. 66. 
Mahan f ' p. o:C. 
2Sw11aon, p. lJ6. 
2~18.han. p. 126. 
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political power on the death of Adrian Pauw, the old lead-
er of the Reeents, that the Dutch recovered so rapidly 
£rom their defeat.JO 
De Witt was a financier and organizer of the highest 
order who also displayed a swiftness of courageous decision 
in momenta of emergency. The immediate effect of the first 
Dutch war was to.show the Dutch how inferior in size and 
armament their war•vessela were to the English. De Witt's 
reaction to this realization was to undertake a· complete 
re-organization or the Dutch fleet. The custom of con" 
verttng merchantmen into ships of war at- the outbreak of 
hostilities was abandoned and large, strongly ccnstructod, 
powerfully armed men-of-war,. carrying sixty, seventy, or 
eighty guns, ·were built. As usual the Dutch ships were 
specially built to pass in and out of the shallow waters 
along the Dutch coastline, but they were built for strength 
rather than speed.· While the major reform was carried out 
in the size and strength of the large ships, De Witt did 
not fail to notice the small, lightly armed, swift-sailing 
English frigates. De Witt had this. type of vessel copied 
to be used for scouting and preying on the enemyf s commerce 
in the event of another war. Aside from the reforms in 
shipbuilding, the supply and training of seamen was revised 
JOEdmundson, p. 218. 
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and re-organized as was the whole system or prize-money 
and pay.31 
The Dutch comeback had started as early as 1657 ,. when 
they checked the French insults against their commerce and 
in 1658 they checked the Swedish power in the Baltic and 
regained control of the entrance to that inland waterway •. .32 
While the Netherlands had recaptured most or the power and 
prestige lost in the first Dutch war, their continued power 
and even their daily bread depended on peace. Their highly 
organised credit had been severely.strained by the first 
war; an example of .this is that they paid a yearly interest 
ot five hundred thousand pounds on war debts. Another 
reason why the Dutch government would not want war was that 
it was likely to upset the republic and bring the Orange 
family back to power.33 
Charles II's first Dutch war sprang from 
those national antagonisms which defy the 
most pacific of governments., Feuds and 
conflicts accumulated for half a century 
were pressing for solution, and to solve 
them without recourse to arms would have 
asked, on either side, a rare magnanimity 
coupled with absolute power. But magna-
nimity could not be expected from mer-
cantilism, and both Charles II and De 
Witt depended for political existt_\nce on 
mercantile support.J4 
Here we have the basic aause 0£ the second Anglo-Dutch 
. ~~Ibid.; PP• .225-228. . 
t1ahan, p. 96. . · 
":.. 33Keith Feiling, )3ritish Foreim Policy ·1660-1672 {Lond9gf .1930), P• 8l.,. , 
bid.;. P• 83 • 
war •. the fact that the commercial jealousies, the nun1erous 
conflicts between the English and Dutch in the Baltic and 
Mediterranean Seas and the trade antagonisms· in the East 
Indies, West Indies and West Africa had not been settled· 
by the first Dutch war.35 While Charles II•s personal 
hatred for John De Witt may have had some influence in 
bringing on· the seconci war,J6 Charles cannot receive 
full blame:for starting this war. 
A gr-eat share in the responsibility for the second 
Dutch war must go to the English merchants, especially the 
East India Company, tor their constant complaints against 
the Dutch. The East India Company presented the govern• 
ment with a long list of vessels confiscated· by the Dutch 
between the years 1654•1659 and valued at three hundred 
thousand pounds. The Dutch had paid fitty thousand pounds 
as an indemnity with regards to· three specified ships under 
an· agreement or 1659 and contended that this must eliminate 
all previous 'claims•· but the East India Oompany ·continued 
to present its· claims and complaints against the Dutch before 
the government of Charles II.37 
Reinforcing the.pressure of the merchants on the gov• 
ernment was the belief that the economic conditions or pros .. 
35p. J. Bloki The Lire of: Admira~ De Ru~er, (London, 
1933)~ P• 203. · . . 
.,6stephen Baxter, William III and the·nerense·9f f4lE:!!:: 
Eean,Ltbertf 1620•lfO~ (New York, 1906), P• 32. 37Feil ng. P• . 02. 
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pe.rity during the first Anglo~Dutch war were due to the 
English success in that war. Coupled with this mistaken 
belier was the £act that the English merchants had suf-
fered heavily in.the war with the -Spanish and believed 
that they could more than make good their losses in 
another war with the Dutch.36 
Under this barrage or pressure from the merchants, 
the government was roroed to take actions short ot war 
against the Dutch, actions which in themselves could 
heighten.the tensions between England and Holland and lead 
dangerously to war,. One action that .the government took 
was to publish and distribute anti-Dutch literature, such 
as an anonymous government publication, Dutch Boare 
d~s.aected; o;r: a Description of .W'Hogg•lf!n~• which said, "A 
Dutchman is a lusty .• Fat 1 Two-legged Cheese-Worm. A crea• 
ture that is so Addicted to eating Butter, Drinking Fat 
Drink and Sliding,. that all the World knows him for a 
Slippery Fellow. An Hollander is not a High-Lander b1.1.~; 
but a Low-Lander' For he loves to be down in the Dirt, 
and Boarlike., ·to wallow therein.n·~9 
The £use of the.second Dutch war powderkeg was ignited 
in Guinea, a section of West Africa where the Dutch and 
English, as in In.dia, were contesting the remains or an 
ancient Portuguese dominion. . The seizure of New. Amsterdam 
in October ot-1664 _did not bother the Dutch as much as a 
5~wilson, p. 149. 
Ibid., p. 126. 
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strong English attempt earlier that year to·gain control 
of Oape Verde in Guinea. While the Dutch had apparently 
written off their colony in America as not worth the tre• · 
mendous cost it ltould take to de.fend it, they felt so 
strongly about keeping their_possession in West Africa 
that in October they ordered a fleet in the Mediterranean 
under De Ruyter to proceed to Guinea.40 
The Dutch did not want war and be.fore taking the ·giant 
step of sending De Ruyter to West Africa, ·Dutch ambassadors 
at·· London had repeatedly protested the English acts of ag• 
gression in New Netherlands and Guinea, with about the 
same results that such strongly worded protests rneet today. 
The English reaction to the Dutch decision to send De Ruyter 
was to begin a war of reprisal in November, 1664, attacking 
Dutch merchant ships and capturing over a hundred by the 
New Year. The stage that follows diplomatic feverishness 
before it touches the crisis of war had been reached by 
November, 1664 and from then on both nations cancelled 
sailing orders, n1assed their .fleets ~n home waters and 
laid an embargo on merchant shipping.41 It was not until 
a Saturday in March.,1665 that the King's declaration: of 
war was solemnly proclaimed at Westminster-by two heralds 
in coats of arms, accompanied by tour mace-bearers, nine 
40 . . . 
41Ibid., pp., 125•132. · Felling, PP• 125·135. 
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trumpeters and two troops of horse and greeted with great 
shouting and rejoicing by the people.42 
To carty out the ·English .objective 0£ hindering Dutch 
trade, a large fleet of over a hundred sail was concentrated 
0££ the ·enemy's principal base at the Texel under the com-
mand of the Duke of York and his subordinates, Prince Ru-
pert and the Earl of Sandwich. In this position, the Eng• 
lish cut off .the bulk of the Dutch navy from the smaller 
Zealand squadron and could block the commerce or Amsterdam, 
forcing the Dutch to either fight at a disadvantage or lose 
their vital convoya.43 The governing .factor of this .plan 
was how long the English could remain at sea, and it was 
due to James' failure to heed the lessons or the first war 
that the English had to abandon their station and lose the 
initiative. James did not provision his fleet at all well, 
considering he was planning a long blockading action, and 
had to put back into port to revictual after only three or 
four weeks at sea.44 
'l'he Dutoh joined their two fleets and gave chase under 
the command of a former cavalry officer, ,Opdarn.4.S He had . 
been plac~d in .command because De Ruyter was still at sea,· 
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but he was not allowed to oper.'lte on his own initiative; 
he had been given strict orders to seek the enemy out and 
do battle with him. This interference with a commander 
in the field or afloat has been throughout history one of 
the most common temptations t:,o a eovernment, and it has 
usually resulted in disa.ster.i~6 
The· two fleets met off Lowesto.ft on tho Norfolk coast 
on -.Tune 13, 1665. Even though the Dutch van gavo way in 
the beginning o£·the fight, ·the battle was fairly even 
until the Dutch center, Opdam•s squadron, crumbled. A 
junior a<l:niral in this squadron had been killed and his 
crew panicked and mutinied, taking his ship out of tho 
aation. The ships intmediately around the deserting ship 
did not know the cause of this movement, but· most assumed 
this was being done on order of Opdam, so twelve or thir-
teen other ships did the same, leaving a huge gap in the 
Dutch line. Opdam was unable to signal these ships to 
return to the fight, so, in a desperate effort to save 
the day, he headed straight for the flagship of the Duke 
of York, but in the ensueing struggle, his ship was blo\ill 
up and he was killed• The Dutch retreated unde:r the cover 
of Admiral Tromp47_and, although there is a long, involved 
46 . 0 Mahan. P• lOo. 
47This Admiral Tromp was the son or the Admiral Tromp 
that commanded the Dutch Navy during the first war and was 
killed at the Battle of the Texal, the last battle of that 
war. Ibid., p. 109. 
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story as to why the English failed to pur_sua,48 the most 
logical reason is that their masts and rigging were so 
crippled by the Dutch firo that they were unable to give 
chase.49 
Beoause the Dutch fleet had been able to retreat to 
safety and the English had not pursued, the defeat was not 
as bad for the Dutch as it could have been; however it !'Jas 
a stinging defeat. The Dutch lost sixteen ships sunk or 
destroyed, nine captured, two thousand men killed (in-
cluding three admirals) and about two thousand men cap-
tured. The English lost one ship sunk, less than a third . 
as many men ~<illed50 and among the dead only one adm:tral. 
The Dutch people were so upset and angry about ·the defeat 
that they threw the elder Evei;tson, who had been second in 
command, in the sea and threw stones at him.51 
Throughout the early part of the war, the French tried 
to mediate for peace between the two bolligerants, but the 
English victory in the battle of Lowestoft made the English 
terms in any treaty with the Dutch too hard for the Dutch 
. 4SThe popular story for the English failure to pursue 
the Dutch after this battle was that Janies's personal sec-
retary, Brouncker, had had encueh of the fight and wanted 
to leave the deck. · In order to prevent the suspicion that 
he was a coward, he pretended that he was entering the Duke's 
cab;tn because he had an order to shorten sail. The Captain 
of the ship believed him and did not wake James up to verify 
his order, so·that by the time James awoke, The Dutch were 
gone. Oeg, I, P• 288. 
49Edmundaon; p. 273. 
SOWilson; P• 2)7. 
5logg, I, p. 288. He was rescued by some of his sailors, 
only to be eourt-martialed, along with several captains, but 
he was acquitted at his court-martial. Edmundson, P• 237. 
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to stomach.52 Fortunately for the D11tch, the .English did 
not fully exploit their victory.53 Immediately afte:t." 
Lowestoft, Prince Rupert and Prince James went ashore to 
enjoy the .fruits of victory, leaving the Earl of Sandwich 
in conunand of the .fleet. Sandwich was in a position to 
pull off one of' the greatest English victories of all three 
wars,. for l4ichael De Ruyter was returning .from punishing 
the English on the West coast of Africa, in the West Indies 
and off Newfoundland. He was loaded down with prizes a;nd 
his fleet was barely seaworthy, a certain prey for an 
Adtniral in conunand of the North Sea. but Sandwich got tired 
0£ waiting for hirn and tried to hit the Dutch elsewhere.54 
In the Danish harbor of Berzen was a rich Dutch mer• 
chant .fleet which had fled there seeking safety from the 
English. The neutral Danish king offered, for a share of 
the booty,· to allow the English fleet to attack the Dutch 
merchant ships, but a misunderstanding arose -vihile the 
English warships were entering the harbor and the guns of 
the Danish forts opened fire on the English,-killing and 
wounding four hund1--ed men; among the dead were six Eng-
lish aaptaina. To get out of the mess he waa in, the 
Danish king allied with the United Provinces and declared 
52F'eiling; PP• 144-145. 
53rvr. A. L. Pontalia. John De Witt Grand Penaionar! or 
Twent7 years of !'.!. Parlirunentarv RePublic (London, 1883~, ' 
Vo!. P• 33~l. . · · · · 
. 5~corbett,. E_ngland i,n the Mediterraneari, II, p. ;6. 
war on England.55 
h'hile Sandwichts fleet was occupied in tho Borgen 
fiasco, De Ruyter's fleet sailed north around Scotland and 
into the Texe1 • .56 The Earl thought he had compensated far 
his blunder by capturing a convoy o.f nine Dutch East India-
men valued at two hundred thousand pounds, but he made the 
mistake of distributing some of the plunder to his offi .. 
cers without conununicating with James and getting per-
mission. This gave his personal enemies, Monck (now t,he 
Duke of .Albemarle) and Cov<mtry, an excellen-t opportunity 
to reoove ·t,he Earl of Sandwich from a position or influ-
ence. Sandwich narrowly escaped impeachment and endl)d up 
as ambassador to Spain.57 
The importance of Sandwich•s downfall lay in the fact 
that he, along with Penn and James., were the .foremost mem-
bers or the so-oalled ttformal" schoo! of thought of English 
naval tactics. These commanders put their faith in rules 
and were prepared to spend much time in maneuvering for 
position. whereas their opposites in naval tactical thought, 
the so-called "dashing" school, represented by Albemarle 
and Rupert, believed· in hard fightinz and taking risks in 
order to secure an advantage. The time spent in maneuvering 
at Lowestoft and the failure to press the advantage dis-
55G. · H. Clark, The. _Later St~art.s 1660-l:Zl!t (Oxford, 
1934) fr PP• 62-6) •. . ~ocorbett, Enp;la·nd in th~ Mediterranean, lI, p. 56 • 
.-170gg, I, PP• 2~0-2Sii. · . . 
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credited the "formal" school) resulting in tha superceasion 
of York and Sandwich by Albemarle and Rttport.58 
But before the "dashing" school had a chance to prove 
itself, gngland was stricken by·the ·last of ,the great out-
breaks· of bubonic .plague • .59 In the words of Bishop Gil-
. bert, Burnet, a contemporary chronicler: 
••• as soon as the war broke,out, a most 
terrible Plague broke out also in the 
city of London, that scattered all.the 
inhabitants that were able to remove 
themselves elsewhere~ . It broke the trade 
of the nation, and swept away about an 
. hundred thousand souls; the greatest 
havock that any Plague had ever made in 
England.· Thi$ did dishearten all peo• 
ple: And, coming in the very time in 
which so unjust a war was begun,·it .had 
a dreadful appearance. All the King's 
enemies and the enemies of Monarchy said; 
here was a manifest character of God's 
·heavy displeasure upon the Nation; as 
indeed the ill 11.fe the King led, and 
the visciousness or the whole Court, gave 
but a melancholy prospect.60 
When Michael De Ruyter reached home in August of 166.5; 
his fleet of nineteen sail and seven prizes filled with 
sugar and five or six chests of gold was in bad shape. His 
sails and cordage were badly out of order and there was 
less than six days' victuals left. for his tleet.61 Tromp 
had been appointed admiral in De Ruyter's absence, but·upon 
. -
his hoped for, but unexpected,return De Ruyter was appointed 
Vol. 
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to command the Dutch fleet, which numbered at this time 
ninety-three men-ot•war,. twelve .fireships and twenty gal• 
liots and speed yachts. ,, The warships carried £orty-three 
hundred guns and twenty thousand men, of whom four thou-· 
sand six hundred were marines.62 
With their spirits lifted greatly by the return of 
De Ruyter,6.'.3 the Dutch set out to build .the finest fleet 
they had ever sent to sea. The fleet that left the Dutch 
coast in search of the English fleet in early June con-
sisted or eighty-four warships, thirteen frigates, eight 
yachts and four fireships •. Although the number·of warships 
De·Ruyter·commanded in June of 1666 was less than that he 
had assumed command of in-August, 166;, the number of guns, 
forty•six hundred, and the number of men, over twenty-two 
thousand, was greater.. over thirty of these men-01"-war 
were of greater atren~th than the biggest Du~ch ships or 
the previous year.94-
Before De Ruyterts fleet set siail, .·the Dutch had 
achieved a diplomatic success which, as it worked out, 
enabled them to win·the longest, bloodiest battle 0£ the 
wars•, Through· their.~ earlier defensive alliance with France 
they were able to persuade Louis. XIV that it was to his 
advantage to join them against the English. While in 
reality, French naval strength was much weaker than the 
English thought, the very existence of a French squadron 
whose avowed pu~pose was to link up with the Dutch in the 
North Sea was enough to profoundly affect the naval cam-: 
paign or 1666.65 
After the French declaration of war~ Sir Jeremy Smith 
was ordered into the Mediterranean in command of a strong 
squadron whose mission was primarily convoy duty to pro• 
tect the English Levant trade. The French assembled a 
fleet, under the command of Beaufort. which consisted of 
thirty French men•ot-war, besides fire-ships and au.xil-
iaries, and eight Dutch ships. While this sounds like an 
impressive fleet, the flotilla was feln by its commander 
to be so weak, that he would not move it until it was 
reinforced by a squadron of twelve galleys, ships which 
were rapidly becoming relics 0£ the past.66 
Monck overestimated the French strength in the Med~ 
iterranean (the major action or the ·Dutch in this war in 
the Mediterranean was to serve as auxiliaries to the 
French) and pulled out a force which, in J. s. Corbettts 
estimation could have easily put an end to the danger ot 
the French. Monck was not of this opinion-and, moreover, 
he .felt Smith's squadron was needed at home for the great 
6SEdmundson, p. 239. 
6°corbett, England in the Mediterranean,. II, pp. 54.;5. 
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push against the Dutch. As soon as ·English strength in 
the Mediterranean Sea disappeared with the last of Smith's 
men-or-war, Beaufort moved his force out of the Mediter• 
ranean and up the Spanish coast to Lisbon. This move was 
immediately misinterpreted by Charles II as a major attempt 
by the French fleet to link up with the Dutch and, in an 
effort to intercept the "French Fleet'', the King detached 
Rupert's squadron from the main .fleet and sent it to the 
Isle o~ Wight.67 
On the first day ot June, 1666, the two fleets met ot£ 
the French coast near Dunkirk.6e The splitting ot the Duke 
0£ Albemarle•s fleet did not bother him perhaps as much as 
it should, 1 for· before the battle he was so certain of vic-
tory that his only fear was that the Dutch fleet might not 
come out.69 When Monck first spied the enemy fleet he 
noticed at once the weakness of the Dutch order of battle 
and bore down on Tromp•s squadron. Tromp cut his cables 
and made sail on the same tack as Monck. · The Dutch rear 
and center also cut their cables and moved to join the 
battle, but could not come into the action between Tromp 
and Monck for some time. In his haste to attack Tromp· 
before he could be assisted by the main part of the Dutch 
fleet, V10nck had left some of his slower ·ships behind. 
liibid.i PP• 56-61. 
69Mahan, · p. 118. Burnet, p. 321 •. 
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As these ships crune up.to assist Monck, they were met by 
·the Dutch center, under, De Ruyter, who was coming up to 
aid Tromp. 
· Some of the heaviest fighting of that £irst day oc·· 
curred at this point:and the. English were rather badly 
mauled, losing two flagships, one by a. fireship. Another 
English Admiral, Sir John Harman. was .. also heavily en--
gaged, but he fought valiantly, drawing his sword to keep 
his panicky crew in line. He was wounded by a topsail 
yard, which was sheared 0££ by Dutch fire, falling on his 
leg and breaking it. The Dutch.vice-admiral; the younger 
Evertson, saw Harman's plight and bore down on him, offer-
ing him quarter. Harman·• s answer to this was ·~, no, it 
is not come to that yet,n and he ordered his men to fire 
a broad~ide at the Dutch ship, which killed Evertsen and 
drove the other ships off .• 70 
While the English had lost.more heavily than the Dutch, 
they had won a tactical victory because Monck had taken 
advantage of the Dutch weakness and attacked a superior 
force in such a way that only part 0£. it could come into 
action. On the second day of the action, the Dutch, who 
outnumbered the English ships by eighty to.forty-four, 
were still in a.badly formed line of battle. Tromp tried 
to correct this detect by an independent action which 
7~han. pp. 119-121 .• 
71 
exposed him to the full fire ot the English fleet. De 
Ruyter saw that Tromp was cut off and hauled up to him 
and, because of the superior Dutch numbers, the English 
broke off the action.71 
After the English retired, Monck .started to retreat 
towards his coast~ in the hopes that he could link up with 
Rupert•s squadron~ On the third day of the battle, he· 
continued the retreat, burning three disabled ships, sand-
ing ahead.the most.crippled and bringing up the rear with 
the ships that were most in fighting condition, some six-
teen to.twenty-eight men-o.f-war. The fact that the Dutch. 
were unable to seriously slow Monck 1 s steady and orderly 
retreat shows that they had been hurt almost as much as 
the English.· 
Towards evening of the third day Rupert's squadron 
was spotted and the two English un.its linked up during 
the night.· The next day, the Dutch had the weather.gauge, 
but Monck and ~pert attacked as soonaa they could. The 
battle raged all ~long the line with the two fleets firing 
broadsides at each other for two hours before the English 
turned .. and charged through the Dutch line, destroying all 
regularity of order •. Although the action was thoroughly 
confused, the Dutch, for the· most part, continued to .con-
trol the wind and eventually the English were f oraed to 
71Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
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retire.72 
One of 'the best contemporary accounts there is ot 
the Four Days' Battle is a letter .from Sir Thomas Clifford. 
who had been sent expressly by the court or Charles II to 
gain the fullest information.about the battle, to ·Lord 
Arlington. Clitf'ord left England in a small, fast shallop 
of six guns on Friday night and reached the scene of the' 
battle at eight o'clock the next morning. · .. By eleven 
o'clock his small sloop was in the midst .of the battle 
and by two o•clook, Clifford was able to.board the ·Royal 
Charles, Monok's flagship. For two or three hours, the 
battle looked good for the English, but then five of the 
bigger English ships, second and third ratest were forced 
by their shattered condition to withdraw from the action. 
During that night and the next day, Sunday, Menck 
conducted his retreat in good order, with sixteen of the 
largest and least damaged or the thirty-four fighting ships 
he had left bringing up the rear and shoving the other 
ships before him in a line. The formation looked like a 
"Tfl with the top of the "T~ being the rearguard and the 
perpendicular line the disabled ships heading tor England. 
Monok maintained this order throughout Sund-ay until about 
three that afternoon when the fleet of Prince Rupert was 
seen, causing much rejoicing and shouting in the English 
72Ib1d., PP• 123-125. 
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fleet. 
In an effort to join Prince Rupert the English fleet 
passed a little too close to the·Galloper sands a~d sev-
eral ships, the Royal Charles, the Royal Katherine and 
the Royal Prince ran aground, but tho Royal Charles and 
the Royal.Katherine ware able to free themselves •. The 
Royal Prince, however, drew much.more water than the others 
and stuck fast, while the Dutch frigates sailed quickly 
towards her •. Then, to Clifford's dismay, the captain and 
crew ot the Royal Prince surrendered without a shot being 
fired at or by' the enemy. 
On Monday morning, the Dutch had the weather gauge, 
but Monck and.Rupert.were fully joined and decided to 
attack. Led by some of their braver commanders, Sir 
Christophe~ Mings and Sir Robert Holmes, the English 
charged the Dutch line and broke through in several places. 
Although the English on several occasions managed to divide 
the Dutch fleet temporarily, the Dutch showed great skill 
in reforming their battle order.. About five o'clock that 
afternoon 1, the English divided the Dutch fleet so badly 
that it appeared as 1£ that portion of the Dutch fleet to 
the leeward of the Royal Charles was setting all the sail 
they could to make a run for it. The English started in 
pursuit, picking up some of the dama~e,d Dutch ships, when 
suddenly• that part of the Dutch fleet that was to windward 
of the Royal Charles tacked in upon the English, separating 
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the Duke of Albemarle's squadron from Prince· Rupert's 
squadron. ·Throughout the rest of this hot and·heavy 
battle, Monck tried to fight his way back to Rupert. 
which he was finally able to do at the end of the battle 
when the Dutch broke off ·contact. 
Because of the heavy damage done by the English to 
the Dutch and disregarding the heavier damage done by the 
Dutch to the English, Clifford considered this battle to 
be an English victory. He was sure that. if the English 
replenished their supplies of ammunition and other pro·-
visions and quickly paid·off their sailors, the.English 
could be ready to.put to sea before the Dutch, and then 
the world would see ·Who won the battle. On the other hand, 
Clifford had nothing but contempt for those English, those 
"cowardly ones", who had quit the battle. He ended his 
letter to I .. ord Arlington with a very conservative estimate. 
of the English losses,·· eight hundred killed ·and fifteen 
hundred wounded, and not more than·five ships sunk, de-
stroyed or captured by the enemy.73 
The Dutch considered the Four; .nays• Battle to be their 
victory, as it was, but they felt it was such a great vic-
tory for them and a disasterous defeat for the English that 
public disaf~ection in England would cause the King to bow 
73Mary A. E. Green (ed.), Calendar 0£ State Pa~ers, 
Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles If, !665.!.i 66 (tonaon, 1864), pp. xix-x.,~!v. 
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out·o£ the war.74 ·The initial news of the .four days' 
fight in England was that the English had won a tremendous 
victory. As the days passed and reports continued to come 
in, it became increasingly obvious that the battle was not 
such a tremendous victory, and perhaps not a victory at 
all, but the inability of the Dutch to follow up their 
victory showed tha·t they had been hurt perhaps· as much as . 
the English.75 It was certainly.not considered such a 
serious def eat by the English as to discredit. the tactics 
0£ the Duke of Albemarle and Prince Rupert. After the 
English Navy Board, led by the guiding spirits Penn, Cov-
entry and Pepys, had worked miracles to get the fleet· back 
to sea in early August of 1666 (at which feat the Dutch 
were astonished), Rupert and Monck were still in command.76 
In the last major battle of this war, the English fleet 
once again caught the Dutch at a disadvantage. The strong 
wind or the day before and the shifting of the wind on the 
day of the battle separated the Dutch fleet and gave the · 
weather gauge to the·· English. 77 , Even sot De Ruyter tried 
to get his fleet in order and might have been able to put 
up a much better fight than he did if not for Tromp, who 
once again disobeyed the order of battle and went off 
~~Colenbrander, I, p. 368. 
Wilson, p. lJ?. · 
7767Blok;·De Ruyter 1 p. 238. Ibid., P• 240. 
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independently to attack a segmont or the English fleet.78 
This action left De Ruyter's squadron to bear practically 
the full weight or the English firo. The Dutch were so 
outnumbered and even the position of De Ruyter' s sh:i.p 
looked so hopeless that the great admiral lost his aom~ 
posure tor probably the first, last and only time in his 
lite. He cried, "Oh my Godl how wretched am I, that among 
so many thousand balls not one will brine me death." His 
brother-in-law, Cornelia De Witt (the brother of John De 
Witt, the Grand Pensionary) heard him and sugeested that 
1£ his position was eo hopeless that he charge into the 
midst of the English fleet and try to grapple the English 
flagship as Opdam.had done in the Battle of Lowestoft. 
Thia snapped De Ruyter out of' his depression and soon he . 
was able to take his crippled fleet to safety in the 
. shallow waters of home.79 
After the Battle of the North r"oreland on August 4, 
1666 (or as it is sometimes called, the St. James Day Fight 
because on the old style calendar, the battle was fought on 
July 25, St. James Day}, the English controlled the sea and 
were.able to take advantage or t,his fact. On August 8, 
Sir Robert Holmes was ordered to attack the -islands or Vlie-
land and Ter Schelling. While doing this, Holmes discovered 
~~Ibid., p. -247. c. M. Davies, Historz of Holland (London, 1854), 
Vol. III, P• 51. 
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a .fleet of one hundred fif'ty Dutch merchantmen waiting 
for.an opportunity to make their. harbors and protected 
by only two men-of-war. The English attacked, easily · 
defeating the two warships· and then proceeded to dostroy · 
most of the merchantmen by fireships~ Only a few or the 
Dutch ships escaped by sailing up a nearby creek; this 
was a tremendous.loss for the Dutch, estimated at one 
million pounda.80 After destroying the Dutch merchant 
fleet, the English landed a .force on Ter Schelling and 
pillaged, plundered, looted and burnad.81 
Almost before the English had had suf.fic1ent time· to 
digest their victories a new·calamity struck. On the night 
of September 2, 1666, a fierce eastern wind in a very. ·dry 
season caused a small fire·to spread uncontrollably through 
London. The niBht was light as day for ten milea aroundS2 
and the fire acted rtas if it had a commission to devour. 
everythi·p;g that was in its way". 83 The .fire lasted for two 
daya84 and paralyzed the English war effort. 
Later in September the English and Dutch fleets came 
within'sight of each other off Boulougne, but both sides 
80ogg, I, p. 303. An interesting thing about this 
action was that the English were guided into the Vlie by 
a Dutoh pilot, Lawrance Heemskerk, who had been banished 
from his country. Davies, p. 54. 
Blwiahan, p •. l.31. . . . 
82E. s. De Beer (ed.), The Diary of John Evelyn (Ox~ 
ford,8~955), pp. 1.,50-.4?1• Burnet,: p. J22. 
. 84na Beer, p. 450. 
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avoided a fight. While tho shortages· or mon and supplies 
on both sides was probably the main reason tha two navies 
did not want to fight, an influential factor may have been, 
as Charles Wilson .thinks, the apparent futility of fiBhting 
without reaching a decision was·taking the heart out of 
both commands.SS 
Because of lack or money to cope with the·· continued 
war, the Plague and.repairing the e~tensive damage of the 
Great Fire, Charles embarked on a policy of economizing 
in·the war effort. The English great ships ware laid up 
and the smaller ships of the English 'navy ware to concen .. 
trate their actions against Dutch trade rather than against 
the Dutch navy. On paper this plan looked pretty good; 
commerce-destroying.· when successful, greatly embarrasses 
the foreign government and distresses its people. But to 
be effective, there must be little or no.enemy navy caused 
by the destruction or that navy in battle or its being 
overawed by a stronger naval force.86 In effect, Charles 
!I's economizing act of laying up the battle fleet was an 
attempt to enjoy a victory not yet secured.87 
By Autumn or 1666, Charles•s plan was beginning to 
have bad results. The Dutch took advantage- of the absence 
of the English battle fleet to establish a limited blockade 
8; . ' . 
86Wilson, pp. 137-138. , Mahan,·pp• 131•1.32. · 
8711iarcus , I, pp. 160-161. 
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ot English ports, severely harassing the coal trade and 
gravely endangering the vital supplies of masts and naval 
stores from the Baltic. By December, the arrival of four 
mast-ships from New England was looked on by Pepys as tta · 
blessing mightily unexpected,· and without which, if for· 
nothing else. we must have failed the next year."sa 
By May of 1667 both sides were so tired of the war 
that they entered into peace negotia~ions at Breda. 
Because the negotiations dragged along, with neither side 
making any substantial concessions, De Witt decided to 
carry out a project he had been planning for a long time, 
a sortie up the Thames by the Dutch fleet.89 
Early in June, 1667. a small Dutch force under Van 
Ghent tried to sail up the river running through Edinburgh, 
but was forced back out to sea. Rumors spread.immediately 
that the Dutch had been.practicing to sail up the Thames, 
and measures were put into effect to protect the river, 
but a few days passed; the rumors died down and the work 
fell ott.90 On the 14th of June, 1667t a fleet of between 
sixty and seventy Dutch men-or-war left the Texel under the 
command of Michael De· Ruyter and Cornelis De Witt. They 
88Ibid.,, I, p. 160. Charles's handling of the last 
phase of tlie war was so distasteful to Pepys and Coventry 
that they tried to wash their hands or all responsibility· 
for this new policy. Wilson! p. 139~ · 
B9f1t!arcus, I, pp. 160-16 • · .. 
90Blok,.Nethcrlanda, IV, P• 329. 
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reached the mouth of the Thames on June 19 and decided 
to try·to force their way into the Medway on the twenty-
second.91 It was well.evident from the very beginning 
that this expedition had been well-timed and well-planned~ 
Soundings of the Thames Estuary had been made; Van Ghent's 
movement, towards Edinbureh had proved to be a feint and 
the whole enterprise was timed so that advantage could be 
taken of the spring tide.92 
A large measure of responsibility .. .for the success of 
the Dutch adventure must go to the English for the almost 
unbelievable mismanagement.and disorganization with which 
t.hey handled the affair. The hastily erected shore batteries· 
failed, not just because they were manned by hastily re-
cruited volunteers, but because the oak planks that should 
have been available in more than adequate quantities had 
been atolen and/or embezzled. As a result the heavy cannons 
of the shore batteries had to be mounted on very thin boards 
(called deal) and every time the guns tired tho wheels broke 
through the planks and sank into the ground.93 Another 
example of the poor planning that the English used in their 
hasty·def'ence·was that, in their hurry to sink ships to 
91Edmundson, P• 21J.3. 
92ogg, I, pp. 309-310. The Dutch were advised in their 
attack up the Thames by Samuel Ravens, an assistant master-
shipwright to O!lristopher Patt, who left England at the time 
of' th93Restoration. Tanner, Pepys' Naval ?~~ .. nutes.1 pp. 46-47. Ogg, I, p. 311. 
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block the channel, they sank a brand new ship and another 
ship loaded with valuable supplies for the fleet•94 
The Dutch surprise attack was a complete success.;. 
They broke through the chain across the Medway and the line 
of sunken ships and captured the flagship of the English 
fleet, the R·oyal Charles, at Chatham• Then, along with a 
-couple of other prizes, the Dutch retreated back out to 
sea.95 
The Dutch attack on Chatham must be ac-
counted one of the most brilliant. auda-
cious, and completely successful strokes 
in the annals of naval warfare. From 
start to finish the operation was con-
· ducted with consummate skill. The navi-
gation of ·the Thames estuary by so ·large 
a fleet, and still more, the orderly re-
trea·~ down the Medway, spoke volumes 
for the fine seaman~gip of the Dutch 
officers and craws."1 · · . · 
Even Pepys, who was no admirer of the Dutch, gave them their 
due: "Thus, in all things, in wisdom, courage, force, :15-1owledge 
of our own streams, and success, the Dutch have the beat ot us, 
and do end the war vdth victory on their side. "97 
Before discussing the Treaty 0£ Breda, there ia. one ~,se 
of the war t,he.t should be discussed• Though he showed little 
inclination to help the Dutch, Louis XIV took advantage.of 
. his alliance with them to advance into the West Indies·. 
914-H. B. Wheatly· {ed.}, ~he Diar:t;. of Samuel Pe:exs ( l~ew 
York• 1946), Vol.- II, p. 554• 
965Blok1 Ifotherlands • IV, pp. 336·.337. 9 Marcus, t, t>• 16!.-
97Ibid., P• 102~ 
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French forces captured St. Kitts in April of 1666, Antigua 
in November and' Monserrat in February 0£ 1667, but in 
April of 1667, Sir John Harmon arrived in the a:rea in com-
mand of: a strong English naval force. Charles II may have 
been economizing in home waters. but the French danger tq 
English possessions in the Carribbean was too great for 
him to ignore. On May 20, 1667, Harman's .fleet defeated 
a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet off Montserrat and the next 
month the French fleet was dec.isively defeated off Marti--
nique, ending the French threat and saving the English 
West Indies.98 
After the.trip up the Thames, the Dutch controlled 
the seas as the English fleet had done in 1654. In July 
of 1667, both sides finally reached an agreement and the_ 
Treaty of Breda was signed. Contraband was restricted to 
munitions 0£ war, visit and search were lightened, the 
principle of n.rree ship,. free goods" ~aa acknowledged and 
the Navigation Act or 1660 was modified so that the Dutch 
could import into England commodities or the growth, pro• 
duction or manutacture or the German hinterland of' Holland. 
England k~pt Deleware,, New Jersey and New York99 and the 
Dutch kept Surinam, which they had captured from the Eng-
lish in March of 1667.100 
98ogg, I, p. 307. 
91· 09W11son, PP• 141-142. OOEdmundaon, P• 243. 
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Called by Wilson "an act of moderation.and good sensen~lOl 
the Treaty of Breda marked a turning-point in Anglo•Dutoh 
relations. "The most acute phase of colonial and economic 
rivalry was now over. In the West Indies and West Africa the 
main problems were settled; elsewhere they were well on the 
way to settlement. The ensuing period laid the foundations 
_, 
ot a community of interest which ultimately found expression 
in alliance." Although this treaty helped, it was not the 
.final answer. "The Breda treaty.h~lp~d the two peoples to 
keep ou~ of each other's way; ·but if other circumstances 
had set.them on opposite sides or European quarrels more 
lastingly than they did in the war or ·1672-4, their eco-
no~ic rivalry, instead of fading away, might have been fought 
o~t to a finish.nl02 
10lw11aon, p. 142. 
102c1ark, pp. 66·67. 
Chapter Ill 
The Third Anglo-Dutth WRr 
The third war between England ~nd Holland in less than a 
quarter ot a eentury was unlike the firet two mainly because it 
was not primarily a result o~ eommereial jealousy between Eng-
land and the Netherlands. The major responsibility tor getting 
England involved in this attempt by Louie XIV to crush and/or 
absorb the Duteh goes to Charles II, who was believing more and 
more that the United Provinces were the permanent and unalterable 
enemies ot England.l . ~hile there was some support among the 
great and rising mereantile oommunity as well as Charles II'a 
courts for another round with the Dutch and while the English 
were yearning to revenge the humiliating· deteat ot the Medway,2 
the,hatred ot the Dutoh by the English had. generally abated, so 
much so that an allianoe with the Dutch was popular With the 
a1auriee Lee, Jr.• The Cabal (Urbana, Illinois, 1965), 
p. ao,. 
"Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 74. 
3 
people .• 
"In the third quarter of the seventeenth eentury English 
tor~ign policy was moving toward one of those massive eha:nges 
' 
of direction which oocur at long intervals in the international 
4 
relations or major states.~" The last change had been a elear 
identification of Spain as the major· enemy during the middle 
of the sixteenth century. with the Freneh and Duteh ~s potential 
!rienda~ While the power structure in Europe had substantially 
altered since Elizabethan times. the Policy makers of the Eng• 
. 5 
lish government had been ve-ry slow to see.this. Most of Ch;\rles•s 
ad'Viaors favored a French alliance, but after the elose of the 
second Dutoh W«r L.ord Arlington had gained the ear or ·the King 
anti had persuaded him that an alliance With. the Dutch wae in · 
. . . . 
England's beet interest. Aa a resultl the 'l'riJij Alliance was 
. . . ' 6 
formed between England~. Holland,and Sweden on January 131 1668. 
'ro Charles the alliance With Holland did not in any ·way 
impair his relations with France~ but eened as a demonstration 
to Louis XIV that alliance With England was valuable and should 
be bought at a decent priee·.. Charles knew that only b1y an alli.:_., 
a.nee with Franee eould success in foreign policy be attained 
cheaply.. From the seeond Dutch war, Charles had learned that 
England alone could not def eat the Dutch·,:· but he tel t that Eng• 
3 
l#1aurice Lee, Jr., The_ Cabal (Urbana, Illinois, 1965),p. 91+• 
4 
Ibid.-, p. 79. 5 . 
Ibid. 6-· 
Ibid. pp. 92 • 93• 
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land and France together could easily do so. An easy, quick 
victory o~er the Duteh would reeoneile the English public to 
the French alliance, which he knew would be unpopular in the 
beginning. By enormously expanding Engl:i~h trade1 the:Duteh 
defeat would swell the King's revenues so greatly that his 
.financial problems would be solved and he1 Charle~ II,. would 
be well on ·the road toward independence of Parliament.·tbe Stuart 7 . • 
dream. 
For this reason Charles entered into the seeret treaty of 
Dover with Louis XIV in 1670, Charles -was to deelare himaelf a 
Ca.tholic and to suppo~ a French war~against the United Provinces 
with the English Navy. In return, Louis was to supply Charles 
· ttdth money to fight the war. Both sides knew that Charles would 
never declare himself·~ a Catholic and· each knew that the other 
knew• but they wenu·ahead and decided on the spring of 1672 as 
the date. to estart the war. Charles knew that the English people 
would never stand tor his deolar1ng himself a Catholic or aeeept-
ing money from a foreign power, so the public Treaty of Dover, 
eigned in Deeember ot 1670, made no mention of these conditions 
a 
and waa only an alliance between Eng1and and France. 
Now all Charles had to do waa to find the mone1 to prepare 
for and .fight the war. In 16711 the King's finaneial' situation· 
Ibid., PP• 96 - 97. g 
Ib~~it PP• 112 • ll). 
was as grim as it had been in 1667. Government revenue ·was 
pledged a year to eighteen months in advance ~o repay loans 
already contracted; the French subsidy was inadequate and when 
Charles asked for eight hundred thousand pounds for the· navy in:. 
October of 1670 1 Parliament gave him slightly more than three 
hundred thousand. To provide money for ~he war, Charles post-
poned the paymente outst~nding until a later date to liberate 
the government revenue for the expenses of war. It is easy to 
see from this that Charles was betting all he had on a short, 
quick and decisive victory, a·war that would not last more than 
9 
siX months. 
In January of 1672 England sent the United Provinces an 
ultimatum summoning them to acknowledge the right of the Englieh 
crown to the sovereignity of the British seas. The Dutch finally 
' . ' 
saw that the increasingly belligerent acts of England were being 
backed by France and could ·no longer be appease~ by concessions~ 
In February ot 1672, the Dutch ordered seventy-five ships of the 
line into commission. Ori ~'larch 23 1 16721 ·the English attacked 
the Dutch Smyrna tleet or merohantmen·L.without a declaration of 
war. While this attempt to seeure rieh booty from the enemy 
immediately failed, ~t was too late to ttirn back. On the twenty-
ninth of that month, England declared war on Holland, ostensibly . 
beeau$e of Dutch failure to salute the English flag, and France 
9 
Ibid. 1 PP• 144 •· 152. 
10 
followed suit on April 6,. 1672·, 
88 
'l'he most important way in which the last. of the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars differed .from the first two was that in this war England 
was.not Holland's chief opponent Qnd £or that reason the naval 
ll 
operations were not the main part of the war. To Louis XIV 
the war was a. sem1-div1n~· punishment 0£ a recalcitrant race; to 
Charles the war was a personal bargain With some advantage to· 
his :subjects; but to the Dutch thew ar was a time or disaster, 
. . 12 .· 
revolution and heroic struggle tor national existence. 
The main feature of the seR. war was that, except for the 
opening ba,tle, the Dutch did not send their fleet out to meet 
the enemy, but fought a de.fen~Jive-offeneive -war,, hiding in the 
shoals and only attacking when it was to their advantage to do 
13 
so. Another characteristic of this war ie that the Englieh and 
·French toeether were.tar too strong for the Dutch to try anything 
14 
in the Mediterranean Sea. 
The initial plan ot the English and French wae to proceed 
to the North Sea and ~hor near the Dogger Bank in the path or 
the homecoming Dutch trade. This would force the Dutch to come 
well out to eea where it could be brought to decisive action on 15 . 
English and French terms. While the· French Navy lacked tast 
10 
Matha•, p. 143. 
11 . 
Clark, P• 74. 
12 
Ogg I, P• .357. 
13 
Mahan, P• 14.4. 
14 
Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 75, 
15 
Marcus. I, p. 16.5. 
frigates and their,smaller ships were unfit for North Sea 
storms, the addition of this force to the English Navy brought 
total strength to ninety-eight warships of six thous~nd guns 
and thirty-four thousand men. In comp~rison, the Dutch had 
only s~\Tenty-five warships with .four thous:;;.nd ·.ri,ve hundred 
' ' 16 
guns and twenty thousand men.' 
The Dutch republic was not as well pr~pared for w;i.:r aa 
it should have been. DeWitt•s policy ot sttengthening the 
navy at the expense of the arr11y because of the fear of the 
military power of the Orange family h~d le!t the Dutch army 
in very poor shape. Also, De Witt had convinced himself that 
the \G.r would be •gainst France alone and, beeauee the Dutch' 
Navy wa.s 'more than a match for the French NQvy alone, the Dutch 
Navy had been somewhat neglected. However, when it became obvi-
ous in March that England was to be in this war, efforts were 
started to bring the strength or the Dutch Navy up to one hundred 
17 -~. 
twenty ships with thirty thousand men. 
The first Dutch plan was to strike the French fleet in their 
home waters before they had time to join the English, but De Witt 
18 
was unable to get the navy ready in time to do this. 'The next 
plan wae to strike the gnglish fleet in the Thaines, before the 
French fleet eould arrive from Brest. The Dutch Navy under De 
lb 
Ogg, I, P• J;a. 
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Ruyter was physically e.apable of achieving this objeetive, but 
was suffering at that moment from a. c~se of acute decentralization 
of the naval administration and the project was never put into 
19 
effect. 
When in June 1 De Ruyter•s fleet was finally able to put to 
sea, his plan was to meet the. combined Anglo-French fleet and 
bring it to battle. He met the enemy and fell back toward his 
own coast, expecting, to fight on his own terms. Ap~rently the· 
Duke of York, who vm.s in eomrntil.nd of the combined fleet, (Monak 
died in January ot 1670) thought the French weren't retidy and 
decided to go home; 50 he ordered the Anglo-French fleet to 
retire to Southwold Bay (also known ~s Sol.e Bay). De Ruyter . 
turned and .followed them a.nd decided to fight them on the seventh 
20 
ot June• 1672. 
·The Dutch .fleet came up ao quickly on the allies that drums 
were beaten to give notice to all seamen to retire immediately 
to their ships a.nd bailiff's were sent to throw all sailors out 
21 
of the ale houses. The French were in.the van to the south and 
the English wero in the center and rear. lhe wind was bltYwi.ng 
towards the coast, which at this poin·t ran nearly no_rth and south• 
giving the Dutch the weather gage. The Dutch advanced $0 rapidly 
that they eaught the French and English in an awkward position; 
the allies had first to cut their cables and get under way and 
19 
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they were not able to fall back to gain time or room to set up 
their battle line. For some unknown reason, the English headed 
north-northeast on a eourse which .forced them soon to turn about 
and the French went down the coast in the opposite direction in 
order to get out to sea. This serious split in the allied fleet 
at the very beginning of the battle put the Dutch in a tremendoue 
position.. De Ruyter sent one division to hold the French while 
22 
he fell on ··the two English divisions with superior numbers., 
Teehnieally the battle was indeeisive, both sides losing 
heavily, but aetu•lly the substantial advantages were all With 
the Dutch. They had attacked a superior for~e in its home waters 
and took advantage 0£ a weakness which wa3 in part due to their 
rapid advance. Bec,use they were able to check the Franch while 
they £ought the English, they upset the allied plans ot a Freneh 
. . 23 
land .invasion supported by naval action by about a n1onth. 
For a while it seemed:as it the French Army needed no assist-
ance of any sort. The :h"rench Army invaded the United Provinces 
I 
early in ilay and, following the Policy of bypassing the smaller 
24' 
occupied towns, within a month had carried all before them. I~ 
seemed in June as if ,the Dutch had lo$t; three provinces had been 
overrun, Utrecht was in,danger o! falling and the Dutch had only 
nine thousand znen to stop the . one hundred twenty thousand of Turenne 
22 
N~han, p. 146. 
23 
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I~id., p. 149. 
25 
and Conde. 
92 
lhe r~pid French •dv.Rnce caused strong public .feelin' ag.ninst 
26 
John 9'.nd Gornelis De Witt,, despite De Ruyter•s m~v-.l vic~ory,. . 
Rlther than allow the house of Orange to.come to power, De.Kitt 
offered to capitul.ate to Louie's peace demands, but the J3'rench de~ 
m;ands were too severe for even De Witt, as hard pressed as he was, 
to ascept. While De Witt~ was negotiating ·\\11th the P1renoh• the Dutch 
resistanoe began to crystallize wlth the opening or the dikes by 
Amsterdam on June 24, 1672. 1ne other cities of the Netherlands 
followed her example and opened their dikes •nd on July 81 William 
of Or~nge was made Stadtholder and comF£nder of the •rmy •nd navy. 
What De Witt had tried to prevent all his life ·- the revival of 
the House ot Orange -- had oeeurred beo•use Louis XIV was too greedy 
and would not tone down his demands. A few weeks later the tr;.ns.;, 
formation of Holland from a. republic to a limited monarahy was 
. 27 
complete with the murder o:f the two De Witts by an angry mob. 
lne first t&sk of the new government was to form an army. 
The Dutch Navy wne; no·t needed tor ~ while .ttfter the victory e..t 
Sole Bay, but the Dutch Army neaded men• so one-third- of the ;ships 
were unrigged to free their sailors and marines for the new Dutch 
2a Army, The Dutch even secured an alliance with Spain which netted 
25 
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29 
them some Spanish regiments •nd by the autumn of 1672 1 the 
Stadtholder w.i.S in coro.rJartd of an army or fi!ty-seven thousand· 
30 
men, with whieh he 3Uirted his upward climb against the French-
In one of the firs·t acts after he begame: ~Stadtholder, 
Willi•rn showed th'1t he was a Wi.ae and capable leader by keeping 
De Ruyter in co1nn1•nci of the Dutch Navy, although he had been a 
.friend of John De Witt Qnd was Cornelis·De Witt's brother-in-
law. In fact, be increased De Ruy·ter's oommand·by making him 
Lieutenant-AdFJiral of the Provinae3 with aln1ost unlimited in• 
structions. William allowed himself to be wholly guiae·d by 
De Ruyter in naval affairs· and the only :tavor that he asked of · 
De Ruyter was that he allow l'romp to be reinstated into the 
31 
fleet, which De Ruyter did. 
ln June of 167.3, the Anglo-Prenc:h fleet, under the command 
of Prince Rupert ('lhe Duke of York bad been foreed to retire 
' 32 
from public office in June of 167) by the Test Aet )was eruis• 
ing along the, southern Dutch eo-.st, hoping th-.t De Ruyter' s flee'IJ 
would come out from behind the shoals ·~ fight. The Dutch were 
Been riding Within the sands of Schoneveldt and a detached asuad-
ron t1'e sent to draw,the~ out. De Ruyter, however, needed no in• 
vitation, for the wind was in hi~ favor, giving him the.advantage 
29 
Baxter, p. 70. 
30 
. . Edmundson, p. 258. 
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Davies. PP• 127-128. '11romp ha.d been deprived from naval 
oonutiand at De Ruyter' s request after his independent action and 
disobedienee of orders ~everely hurt the Dutch in the battle of 
the North Foreland. Edmundson, P• 241. 
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of the weather gage. He .used his advantage well and came out 
·33 
so quickly th«.t the t.t.llied line was hit before it was formed,. 
1bis hit....and .. run .aetion of De Huyter was indecisive, but 
a week later in the second battle of the 3choneveldt• De l?uyte:r:· 
attacked again when it ma to his advantage to do :so. In 
ano·ther indeeisive action he hurt the. Anglo-French fleet ~dly 
enough to foree it to return to the English coast to refit and 
take on new supplies. In both battles the Dutch and English had 
only a little over fifty ships o! the line ~nd the French had 
34 
a little,less than thirty. 
Prince Rupert's failure to bring De Ruyter to deeieive 
aetion in the campaign or 1673 was due in part to the !•ct· that 
the, government could not.adequately man, provision and equip 
the flee:t or even maintain a sufficient reserve of stores for 
.. 35 
refitting and repairs. Obviouely Charles's gamble or1 ~. six 
3 
~.i*.han, pp~ 151 - 152. 
34 
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l·l:iilreus, I. p .• 16?.. In faet, as a result of this, the 
Dutch fleet had got·ten to sea be·tore the English and in early 
May tried to block the narrow Sw:tn channel of the Trutmes estu ... 
ary With sunken hulks filled with rocks. It it had worked, a 
eonsiderable part of the English .fleet would 11:4ve been immobil-
ized, but at the last minute a dense tog foreed the Dutch to 
sail slowly as they were escorting the sinkers into pl«ee, allow-. 
ing the English to be warned in time. · Then Rupert, in a daring 
teat of seam~nship, sailed through the tog and the shoals and 
took the Dutch force by surprise, forcing them to abandon the 
sinkers and return to Holland. Ibid. 
95 
month W&l.r had not paid otf. The initial enthusiasm !or the 
war rapidly faded aw:.y as the w.ar d~a.gged on, and the rel~e-· 
tance of the Freneh to fight greatly inere•sed their unpopu.-
36 
larity in Engl.and. 
In August, the Anglo-French forces appeared off the 
northern Dut;ch coast, ·with the intention of landing troops, 
but De Ruyter stayed in the shallow w.aters along the oo-.st, 
biding his time. During the ni~ht of the twentieth, the 
wind shifted so that it was to De Ruyter's advanUige. With 
Q.bout seventy ships he c•1rne out to fight sixty English ~nd 
thirty French ships. Once ag6l,in1 De Ruyter' s strategy w:ts 
to hold t.he French in check while they fought the English on 
37 
equal terns. 
~~rtel, the French admiral cornmanding the van of the 
French fleet, W'tS ordered to stretch ahead• go about ~md gQin 
to windward of the Dutch van, in order to catch the Dutch in 
a cr·ossfire, but the Dutch Adn1ir::1.l, &nkert (who had lost a 
leg in the battle of Lowestoft} sa.w the danger and r~n through 
the remaining French ships with his twelve. B&Lnkert then stood 
down to join De Ruyter, who had been. driftit1g out to sea with , 
Rupert. This ~;as a, deliberute act on the part or the Prince, 
)6 
ru.g_. J P• 172., 
37 
Mahan, p. 152. 
desiened to draw the DUtch away from their coast so that it 
the wind shifted the Dutch would be unable to return to the 
prot;ection of their shallow waters. D•Estrees .•. the commander 
of th~ Freneh fleet, claimed that this seperation of. the center 
from the van prevented his aiding the English; however Banker• 
JS 
was ~oming from the s~me direction and was able ·to join De Ruyter.· 
The main fighting of the· battle of the Texel was in the 
eenter between the Dutch and English where two duels were t@.king 
place. 11he .fighting betwEH"'n Sir Edw.ard Spragge and 1"romp 'Was 
so fierce.that both •dmir~ls had to cru:tnge ships three times; 
and on the third change of flag, Spr:tl.gge was killed. Rupert 
was so ha.rd<Mlpreaaed by Bankert and De Ruyter that he w.as .firing 
broadeides to Windward &nd leeward. He managed; however, to 
edge over to his rear...admiral to gather his forces for one last 
39 
tight .. 
In the words ot Pr-lnce Rupert, "If the Freneh,then lying 
within distance to windwards had obeyed my signall, and borne 
downe upon the enemy aeeording _to their duty, I must have 
routed and torne them all to pieees. It was the plain1!3t and 
. 40 
greatest opportunity ever lost at sea." 
As a result of the Battle of the Texel (or as the Dutch 
. 41 . 
c~lled it, the Battle of Kijkduin) 1 ~nother indeeisiv~ aetion, 
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the Dutch harbors were cleared for returning merchantmen 
42 
and the possibility of an enemy landing ~•s eliminated. 
An even more important result of this battle was that it 
tanned the !lames or distrust or the English for the J;'reneh. 
The English people were much more-appreciative ot a determined 
. 43 
enemy than they were ot a fiokle ally. A captured Dutch 
seamen said o:t the French unwillingness to aid the English 
that the French "have hired the English to fight for them 
and all their business here is to see that they earn their 
44 
wages." An English evaluation of the value or the alliance 
is given in th~jseontemporary letter: 
•• • tor -they are here not a little perplexed1 
as well by reason of the .want of money, as 
naval ammunition; to which adde the daily . 
g:r~ving jealousy against the French, which 
the King must dissemble against his Will, 
being obliged to say agains·t his better know-
ledge, and·to still the report, that the 
French had tought well, apprhehending that 
it he should owne the truth, he would be re-
proached by the whol~ nation. for having too 
hastily engaged himself 'td th the .French, who 
see nothing .else th~n by corruption and .fraud 
to g$t the nior.tarahy _or all Europe. For, since 
tlle late fight it hath been said plainly 
enough, that the French D~SSEIN appears, and 
the English, among other kindnesses, hs.ve 
shewed them not only the manner and order ot 
fighting at sea, ·without endangering them, but 
taught them also the toasts, sands, banks, 
advenues 1 ~nd in ~hort, LE POR'l'E ET LE FOIBLE 
of this kingdome,45 , . . 
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The growing resentment against the French, the improbability 
. ot ever fighting a conclusive action against the Dutch :itnd the 
tremendous lack of money wi'tb.Whieh to continue the war eaused 
an a.nti-·war feeling in England which Chii.rles II could not ig• 
nore,. On February 19, 1674; despite the rrreaty of Dover, Eng .. 
land signed a seperate peace 'With the Dutch. Louis XIV wanted 
to sign a peaee treaty with the Dutch while he still had control 
over large amounts or Dutch territory, but the Dutch had the 
upper hand now and fought on until 16?6. By that time Louis 
XIV was fighting the House of Hapsburg in Spain and Germany 
46 
and had to pull his troops out of Holland. 
'!be treaty·or Westminster was another act of model'iiltion 
and good sense. The honor of the flag was again ceded to 
England and British.waters were de.tined ae etretehing· from 
Cape Finisterre to Van Staten in N0 rway. The Dutch allowed 
'the English colonists to leave Suriruun With their slaves and 
possessions ~nd returned New York, which they had captured 
during the war. While nothing was said about the position of 
the Prince of Orange or of herring fishing in British waters, 
the Dutch paid the English an indemnity ot nearly two hundred 
47 
thousand pounds. 
The two most impor~nt changes that -oceurred during the 
D-.Jteh ~iars were the rapid advances made in naval technology 
and m.v&t.1 tactics And the tremendous losses the Dutch suf.tered 
46 
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' in terms of their merehant fleets, their tradej their eredit 
and their economy. l'he most Siinifieant change in naval tech-
nology was the greatly increased size Q.nd firepower or the 
l~rge ships. 1'he big ships of the first Du.teh war were the 
medium-sized ships of the second and third wars. 
However• one must remember that, in the words ot Sir 
Anthony Deane, the great seventeenth century English ship-
builder: 
••• no one shape of a ship can .be in general 
said to be the best; for every distinct use 
requires a different shape, and the skill lies 
only in building best for the p.rticular use 
designed• whieh differs as your purposes for 
this or that depth 0£ water• for speed, for 
strength, £or weight ot guns, fo~ number ot 
men, for calm or rough seas, tor short or 
long voyages, for storage of goods~ and many 
other circumstances, as fewnet;;~ of hands to 
sail with.; bearing sail, ete.4 
While the English had the bigger ships and the, bigger guns a~ 
the start of the -wars, they too bef\e!ited .from the advances 
in naval teehnology. The English benefited from both the 
French and the Dutch designs. In the second Duteh war, the 
English noticed that the lower tier of guns on Dutch ships 
was tour feet rrom the water 4nd that the Dutch ships could 
store provisions to~ .four months while the lower deck guns in 
English ships were three feet from the water and English ships 
earried provisions for only ten weeks. Led by Sir Anthony 
Deane, English shipwrights copied the Dutch and came out with 
48 • • J 
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the Warspite •nd the Defianee Which c"'-rried their lower tier 
0£ guns four and a half feet tron the water and could store 
provisions for six months. In the third Dutch v.-.r, the English 
noticed th-.t the French ships were wider in the be;ua, making them 
49 
more battle-worthy, which design the English then copied. 
The s~tement hRa often been made that the English ships 
were more heavily armed than the Duteh, but just how great a 
difference w.ts there? The armament or the Royal Prinee 1 a 
first elass ship taken by the Dutch in the Four Days' Ba-tJtle 
of the second Duteh war,. was fourteen guns firing shells weigh-
ing forty~eight pounds, fourteen thirty-two pounders,,thiriy 
'twenty-..four pounders, sixteen twelve pounders and rourteen·s1x 
50 
pounders. While for the most part the heaviest eannon on a 
Dutch ship fired • twenty•four pound cannon ball, there is 
record of ~ few thirty-six pounders, but no mention of any 
51 
forty-eight pounders. This apparently tremendous disparity 
between the sizes of the eune carried by both fleets is not 
· aa great ~s it seems, however. The English tactics o:t firing 
a.t the enemy hulls, to be effective, would call ror heavy guns, 
while the Dutch would not i1eed more tha11 a twenty-four pounder 
to carry out their tactics of f'iri11g at . the enemy's masts and 
rigging. Another point to consider ia the r-.at that the more 
49 
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water it would draw, negating its &dvant;.ge or being able to 
retreat to safety in the shallow w~ter of its eoastline. Also, 
there is evidence that the Duteh invented chai11 shot, the first 
52 
recorded uae of which: ie in ·the Four Days' Battle. This new 
we~pon grea.tly increased the effectiveness of the Dutch battle 
tactics and lessened the need for heavy guns on Dutch ships. 
Mlile there w~s a tremendous increa5e in the eize and 
firing p,ower of i~nglish -nd Dutch. ships between the ·first and 
second Dutch lr.trs, the increase was not ~s great between th• 
second a.nd third l'tar:s. In the second Dutch 't"mr, the heavieai 
English snips carried between ninety .and one hundred guns and 
this wa5 increased.only slightly in the third ~~r. For this 
war, the English had three £irst-n.te ships, .the Sovereign, 
the Prince; and the Charles, mounting one hundred ten guns, 
earrying crews of almost eight hundred men.and havlng :a tonnage 
53 
of t~o thous~nd or more. 'l'he English even had one 5hip, the 
54 
Prince Royal, carrying one hundred twenty guns .. 
Because 01: tha shallovmess of their t\ra ters, the Dutch 
could not build much bigger ships than they built in the setond 
55 
Dutch war. Although the Dutch ships or the second war were 
bigger and 5tronger than those of. the tirst, because of greater 
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and thicker timbers being used, making the ships wider Qnd 
56 
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giving the guns and crew more ro01u. 'l'hsre w.as not that ,much 
difference between the Dutch ships of the second and third wars-. 
As an example, De Ruyter's t'l~gehip, the Seven Provinces, earry-
ing four hundred seventy-five men and eighty guns, was brand 
new in 1665 and was the sarne ship De Ruyter used through.out the 
57 
third war,; De Ruyter' s ila1;ship •lso serves to illustrate 
another point, the .fa.ct that the Dutch ship5 of the 5econd and 
,third Dutch wars were much etronger and more -.ble to \'Ji thstand 
58 
heavy .fire than those of the first war. De Ruyter's flagship 
wa3 in the thick o! the fighting throughout ·the second and third 
Weirs and survived every battle. 
, In navQl taeties there was not rts r*lpid progress throughout 
~he wars .as there had been in n~v~l ·technology. The most import-
ant improvement was the line-of-batt,le .formo.tion., whieh evolved 
during the first war. Until the Dut.oh r'1et their equals at sea 
in the form of the English• the necessity of war did not force 
eailing; fleets to sail in line. Since the di5'1.ppearana€! or the 
galley, almost all the guns on a ship of W».r w®re found on the 
aides• t\;_'\;\S the be~m, or side of a. ship• should at all time:s be 
turned tol~.rds the enemy. Another adv;.ntage :or the line ·was that 
. 59 
the enemy eould beat be kept in siEhL by a line ahead formation. 
The fighting instruations issued by the Duke of York were 
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,based on those of 1654, but a distinction was introduced between 
defense against an attack from wind~~rd and against that from lee-
ward and an .attempt wa.s n1ade to aehieve greater mobility. One must 
remember• however, tha't the :scien,ti.fic elen1ent in maritime tactics 
in the seventeenth aentury was very small; the se-vere deficits ot 
the square-rigged ship limited the primary objective of a fleet to 
sinking or capturing the enemy, by gun-fire, fire ships, boarding 
or foreing the enemy on the shoals. The primary prerequisite for 
attaining theee objectives was to obtain the weather-gauge, that 
ia1 to get to windw..rd of the enemy and retain this tae~ieal advant-
age throughout. The advantages 0£ this position were that the .fleet 
with it had the initiative, since it could down on the wind and 
attack or hold baek if it were not ·co its advantage to attack. 
Anot,her ~dva.nt .. ge ~s ·that gwmers on the \dnc,Wit,rd ships had an 
unimpeded view of the enemy, beeause the smoke was being blol~ 
away. Also, £ireships, tb.e most. dreaded engines· of naval -warfare. 
could be drifted downwind towards ·t;he enemy,., T'he one disadvantage 
ot the weather gauge w~s that, in a stiff br~eze, the lower tier ot 
guns on the leeward side were likely to be under water and thus 
60 
eould not be brought, into action. 
'fne gaining of the weather-gauge was like irdnning the toss 
of the coin in a football game but, a.tter this Winning of tl1e 
initial advantage wasi iobtained, there was no clearly defined 
principle to follow. In the last two Dutah ~"ars. the general 
practice was for ·the two £leet,s to file past eaoll other, firing 
65 
Ogg, I, P• 266. 
104 
at the enemy's hulls and rigging. lnen the ships in the lead 
(the van) bore round to take up position behind the rear.most 
ships in order to repeat the att~ck. When the order of b.ittle 
was broken. there was usually a general melee in which the dis-
abled ships might be burnt by fireships or boarded. I'he English 
were better disciplined thiAn the DutGh bee~use they did not have 
roving free-lances like the younger 'rrom1). nor were their fleets 
divided into Orange and De Witt factions. But the ~ain disting• 
uiahing ch~r,;.eteristic of the Eni:J.ish was the preeisio11 with which 
61 
they kept their line. In ·t.he words of .a French1na11 v.iho i.d tnessed 
the Four Days' 11-.ttle {a Dutch viotor·y): 
Nothing equ;;.la the-beautiful order of the En~lish 
at sea. Never was a line drawn straighter than 
that forme<l by their ships; thus they bring; all 
their fire to bear upon those who draw near them 
•• •.'.I.hey fight like a. line of cava.lry which is 
handled according to rule, and applies itself 
aolely to foree ba~k those who oppose; whereas 
the Dutch advance like cavalry 'Whose squadrons 
leave t,geir ranks and cmne seper•toly to the 
charge •. 2 
Another characteristic of the English Navy w~s their great faith 
in their gunners, causing them to place less reliance on boarding 
thQ.n did other navies (notably the French). 'nle bulk ot the 
great Dutch hulls, plus the proportion of unseasoned wood in 
the hulls, caused th~ English to aim at the Dutch hulls, while 
the E~glish present~d a smaller rreeboard. (the distance between 
the waterline and the deck) strongly influencing the Dutch to 
63 . . 
aim at their masts and rigging. · 
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The most important occurrence during' these twenty-two 
years of intermi tteigtt\fr.4?"'f.are \~Ct.s the creation of two well-nigh 
invincible navies, each with its o\m -.dvantages and differences., 
knocking heads Viciously three times in less than a quarter of 
a century, but e~.ch navy unable to fatally hurt the other.. It 
is unusual in history tor two such powerful navies to develop 
side by side, and the disappearance of one navy would naturally 
leave the other supreme on the seas. In the remaining two 
years or the Franco-Dutch land struggle, the Dutch fought a 
war of reconquering lost territory. The erain on the limited 
Duteh resources overtaxed Duteh strength, forcing Holland to 
sacrifice her navy in order to maintain a large standing army 
64 
with which to fight Franc~. 
; 
In the first war there was a great controversy as to 
whether the Dutch Navy should be used primarily to convoy the 
Dutch merchant ships or to attack and try to destroy the English 
Navy, but this was no longer an issue by the second and third 
wars. In the first war the ruling oligarchy of Holland was so 
worried about losing money in a war with England that they ser .. ~~ 
iously hanpered the Dutch war effort by assigning it to convoy 
duty. By the time of the second war, the Dutch had profited by 
their mistakes. They had seen that major conflicts ·with the Eng-
lish Navy would force it back to its home base to refit and the 
Duteh could then sneak in convoys of merchantmen with only ligh' 
escorts needed to drive away English privateers and commeree-
4 .. 
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raiders. Thus, the main duty of the Dutch N~vy in the second 
wa.r was to a. ttack the enemy fleet, and the protee·tion of mer-
65 
chant convoys l~S only a minor duty. In the ·third Dutjoh war1 
the main duty of the Dutch fleet was to pr"vent «. landing by 
the Anglo-French forces and, if possible, "to d~nage them enough 
in ha.tt>le ·to s~nd them home for a while.. No ships were dispatched 
for eo11voy duty, le~ving tho nerchantmen pr~ctieally on their 
66 
own. 
In any war With t>he English, the Dutch rnereh:a.nts were bound 
to suf.f er heu vily because Bngl~nd ''ilas situated in such an ~dvan­
tageous posl t:,ion as to be ui.ble to th:re;-i t~n the major Dutch ·trade 
routes, while the English tr;lde I'outes ·were not as easily threat-
ened. fue su<JCdss of tjhe Dutch policy of ott.Rcldne; the English 
fleet rather ·than providine J.ar,::;e convoys for Dtttch merehRntment 
'ir~s evidenced in tha:c, i._i1ile the Dl1tch mety havo lost o.s many as 
one thousand •?igh·t hundred sh:tps to t:'H~ Enelish in the first w.tr1 
they lost only about five hundred :tn e.ach of the other two iwars. 
Still, lo:sine "only" fiv(! hundred ships is ~ tr~mendous blow to 
a nation's economy. In ~pit1! of the English overseas trade 
being much smaller than tha·t of the Dutch at this time, the 
English 1nerchants keenly felt the loss o.f the .five hundred ships 
that the Dutch were ~ble to otipture or destroy throughout all 
67 
three ·wars. 
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The second Dutch i.iVar had proven to the E11glish that the 
successes of the first war could not be improved upon or even 
68 
as easily repeated. After the third Dutch w;.r, the ~git~tion· 
;.bout Dutch maritime superiority f:.liled to re~ppe~r in ~ny 
strength because the Entilieh had been shol>wn1 through the use 
of Dutch prizes, the Wa.y to cheaper shipment of goods and 
69 
shifted that W*ly ·theruSt-'lv~s. ,,\bile 011 the one hand the grad-
ual n:ivetl evolution or the seventeenth century eventu.lly ex-
cluded armed roerchilntmen from navi'-'S so that if they ser\fed at 
. 70 
.Qll it was ~s provision ships, convoy escorts or fire shipe, 
01i. the other hand, the emergence of the English !b_vy from the 
Dutch \\Jars as the most powerful navy aflorJ.t eliminated the need 
for English merchant ships to be heavily an·Jed. 
"The great hopes of t,hern of Holland is that this -warre will 
not continue long, the leni.rch and continuance u11er~~of nust cer-
t:ainly mine them ~nd tu.rnt? the trade in.to other channels, every 
71 
nation gettinr:; a share th(ereof. u lh~re, in a letter of April 
28, 1665, from _Do"lming, the E:n:;lish ambas:!-ador in Holland, to 
Lord Arlington, is see11 the cont~mpon1ry view c .. f the hurt being 
done to Dutch tra{:e by continued \'f.f.rf~.re l'-li. th the English. The 
significance of this leti;er is th~. t it ".~.s written during the 
second tutch war .. while most of the damage to Holl~nd "11as done 
68 
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during the first and third Dutch i:ars. ·rhe Dutch cmr.merce 
suffered so heavily in the f'irs t 1~r a.nt! their highly org~n-
izcd credit had been so strained thn.t they Wero p:;.ying a yearly 
72 
interest of five hundred 'thous&nd pounds on w~.r debts• · 1I'l.1e 
second war hurt by increasing this dcbi.; 1 but the las"G war was 
the crushing blo~'l for the United Provinces. The fact that liol-
la.nd w~rn fighting for her Vtry ex.i.stf.mce GJ.g~inut a superior 
s~rvecl her independemce, hut this tremendous cffot•t h~d fa t'4.lly 
undermined her pros1)eri ty ;1 nd cost the Hetherlcands her :maritime 
73 
:?. .. ncl co~nerci~l preen1inence. The tr~t.gedy of the Dutch wars tiaS 
th~ t both Snglaud ~.nd Holland made the cor:x..!on er·roi:-· of supposing 
that the tr~.d~ of either people could only prosper ~l t the ex-
74 
p~nse of the:; other. 
Just. befor~ the Bt:~rt of. the firBt /\.nglo-Dut:,ch w;1r, the 
lish are Q.bout to :-:"1.ttack <.?. r:.::c·tmu;_in of golc; Ke ~re ~.bout to 
P.t't4ick ~- mount~in of iron. --:~75 His predict.ion !~cw~c true in that 
the English benefited tremendously from the three greGI, t wars 
botween tTr!o a.lmost -equa.lly r::a·cched r1~1.val po:,,,rers, ?6 On the one 
hand the way was paved for English corrrrnercial ex~.nsion ·while 
7723-~eiling, p. 84. )mreus,·It p. 173. 
~;;~rbour, p.~290. 
\dlson, p. 60. 
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on the other hand, a global navy was born with the exist-
a.nce of a pow·erful reserve kept in the Downs, a Medi ter• 
ranean ·station, a moderately s·trons West Indian squadron 
and the begj .. nnings of a 1for1ih American station. 77 In the 
fu'ta1re, this navy was to be an influ(mtial factor in con-
tinental politics.78 These were the benefits resulting 
from attacking a mountain of gold; for at .. Gacking a moun-
tain of iron the Dutch lost heavily. While, technically, 
t•~ 
the Dutch lost the first war and won th~ next two, they 
were Pyhrric victor:tes. While the Dutch checked the ag-
gressors, the tremendous cost in so doing, meant the 
eventual loss or a large part of their world trade to the 
English and decline from their position of power. 
?~Oppenheim, pp. 302-JOJ. 
-7 Ibid., p. 305. 
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Appendix A 
A Map ot the Main Battle Area 
J 
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Appendix B 
A List of English Men-of •War 
Below is a list of English ships with the number or 
men and the number of guns they carried, as of June, 1666: 
Ship's N'ame 
First Rate Ships .. 
Royal Soveraigne 
Prince Royal 
Prince 
Royal Charles 
Royal James 
London 
Second Rate Ships • 
Loyal London 
Viotor1 
Royall Oake 
Royall Katherine 
Henry· 
Tryumph 
Old James 
Swift sure 
St. George 
St .. Andrew 
Rupert 
Defyance 
Warspite 
Unicorne 
Vanguarde 
Rainbow 
Number of M!ffi 
700 
624' 
700 
650 
;20 
470 
470 
450 
450 
450 
440 
4.:30 
380 
380 
360 
360 
320 
320 
320 
320 
320 
.320 
· Number . of Gilns 
92 
92 
90 
82 
82 
80 
76 
"76 
76 
76 
72 
72 
70 66. 
66 
66 
64 
64 
64 
60 
60 
.56 
Third Rate Ships -
Fairef ax 
Mary 
Henrietta 
Anne 
Yorke 
Revenge 
Cambridge 
Montaigue 
Dreadnaught 
Plymouth 
Monke 
Dunkirke 
Resolution 
Gloucester 
Essex 
House or Sweden 
Clovetree 
Helversone 
Golden Phoenix 
Monmouth 
Leopard 
JOO 
300 
300 
280 2so 
300 
320 
JOO 
280 
280 
280 
280 
300 
2SO 
260 
280 
250 
260 
260 
320 
2;0 
60 
60 
58 
58 ;a 
58 
~a 5g 
;s 
58 
58 
58 ;e 
56 
70 
62 
60 
60 
64 
56 
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As one can see, there were no hard and fast rules for 
determining whether a ship belonged to one rating or another. 
In addition to the ships given above of the £irat 1 second and 
third rating, there.were at this time: 
62 fourth rate ships carrying between 34-52 guns, 
27 fifth rate ships carrying between 20-36 guns, 
27 sixth rate ships carrying between 6·14 guns, 
6 hired merchant ships carrying between 36-70 gufs; 
and 20 Dutch prizes carrying between .38•70 guns. · . 
lcolenbrander, I, pp. 319-331. 
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Appendix C 
A List 0£ Dutch Men-of-War 
Below is a list of Dutch ships· and the number of men 
and guns they Qarried as 0£ May, 1665: 
Ship ts f~ame 
Concord 
Lief de 
Mar seven 
Orange 
Court de Zelande 
Grand Hollandia 
Oosterwijck 
Del£lant 
.Sevenwolden 
La Maison de Swieten 
Oostergo 
Hilversun 
Passe-Temp 
Cruyningen 
Liberte 
Couverden 
Leopard 
Ville et Villages . 
Oelre 
West.frise 
Medenblick 
Stoveren 
Suyderhuys 
La Paix 
Gouda 
Number of Men 
soo 
400 
450 
1+50 
300 
350 
325 
400 
.)00 
300 
325 
290 
260 
250 
250 
240 
250 
2lt0 
290 
290 
290 
220 
230 
2.30 
230 
!~umber of Guns 
84 
82 
78 
75 
78 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
62 
62 
62 
62 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
59 
.58 
56 ;6 
56 
Le Paroq d1Hollande 
Wester go 
Cam pd en 
Tromp 
Maison d'Haerlem 
Carolus V 
Petite Hollandia 
Jaersvelt 
Provinces 
Duyvenvoorde 
Wakende Boey 
Nagel bloom 
La Bourse 
Concorde 
Joaua 
Princess Albertina 
Terveer 
Rotterdam 
Oostlandia 
Prince fl'iaurice 
2$0 
253 
220 
210 
220 
2.30 
204 
220 
220 
220 
220 
220 
240 
258 
250 
235 
230 
2JO 
z;; 
250 
56 
54 
54 
54 
54 
53: 
.52 
52 
52 
52 
52 
52 
52 
52 
50 
50 
50 ;o 
so 
50 
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In addition to the above named ships, the Dutch also 
had at this time 43 ships carrying between J0-48 guns and 
9 ships carrying from 18.26 guns.l 
laranville Penn, Memorials or·the Professional Life 
and Times of Sir William Penn, Knt. (London, 1§33), VoI. II, 
PP• jI8-JI9. ' 
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Appendix D 
A Letter from Clifford to Lord Arlington 
Below is printed the text of the letter referred to 
in Chapter II, pages &2•74: 
••• Upon Friday night the lst instant, we 
had a fresh gale or wind all night and 
next morning, by eight of the clock of· 
which, we made both the fleets engaged, 
and they had been so £rom three 0£ the 
clock in the afternoon or the day befora, 
for my Lord General going that day for 
the Gun Fleet, his scouts brought him 
notice of the Dutch fleet near him, and 
so he made his engagement of them almost 
necessary. By 11 of the clock Saturday, 
we came close up to the engagement with 
our little shallop of six guns, and my 
Lord or Ossory would fain have had an 
opportunity of giving the Dutch Admiral 
a broadside in her. By two 0£ the clock, 
in the heat or the fight, with much ado 
we got into the R. Charles, where we found 
things all well. and matters looked with a 
good aspect on our side f'or two or three 
hours, but then, after another pass, .five 
0£ our better sort of ships or the second 
and third rates were so shattered that they 
ma.de ·- some with leave and others without -
leave - toward our own ports, which was a 
great disheartening to the rest; especially 
since so many good ships also had left the 
fleet the day before, immediately after the 
first pass, without any notice ot their 
condition given to my Lord General; of 
which are the Henry, the Swiftsure, the 
Rainbow, the Loyal Merchant, and I think, 
the Portland. In fine, upon Saturday 
night we round we could make but 34 
fighting ships, and the Dutch hard enough 
upon us; and then there was nothing to· be 
heard among the common seamen but com• 
plaints against dividing our fleet and 
sending away Prince Rupert. This was a 
strait, and my Lord General's conduct was 
here well seen to be very good, for he 
chose 1:>'u·~·:l6 of the greatest ships of 
these 34, to be a bulwark to the rest, 
and bring up the rear in a breast, and 
so shoved on the other in a line before 
him, and in this manner we maintained 
an orderly and good retreat all Sunday, 
the 3rd instant, till about three of the 
clock that afternoon, when from topmast 
head we made a fleet coming toward us, 
which we supposed to be 1 as it was,· Prince Rupert and his squadron. Within little 
we made their,· flags and hulls, and then 
in our whole fleet there was such shouting, 
and the English haloo that the Dutchmen 
that were all along firing at us were at· 
a little pause, however kept on after us, 
and we, endeavouring to join with Prince 
Rupert, fell too near the shoal ground, 
and first the Royal Oharles herself struck 
upon the sands they call the Galloper, but 
.came presently well off, so did also the 
Royal Katherine; but the Royal Prince, 
drawing more water than either stuck fast. 
The Dutch with their small frigates immed-
iately made towards. her, attlended with a 
fireship or two, and we sent four or five 
of our frigates to defend her, that drew 
least water-, apd we ourselves would come 
as near as we durst £or the sands; but to 
the wonder of the whole·£leet, we saw the 
flag and ancient struck, and she yielded 
-- when she had not herself' either shot ten 
guns in her defence or received ten shot 
from the enemy; 15 of their men came to us 
in their boats, and they say they had four 
fathom or water upon one side, and but two 
on the other of their ship. When we had joined with Prince Rupert, we hastened up 
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where she lay, for though the Dutch had 
possession'.0£ her, yet she still stuck 
fast, and when they saw they could not 
keep her, they set her on fire, the 
sight of which was a sensible touch to 
every man's heart in our fleet, es~ 
pecially since a little resistance would 
have preserved her, and that she was so 
able to stand it out. She was like a 
castle in the sea. and I believe the 
best ship that ever was built in the 
world to endure battering, but she is 
gone, and this is an ill subject to be 
long upon. 
This evening, the Jrd, we followed the 
Dutch as close as we could and the night 
would permit us. Monday morning, the 4th 
instant . at sun rising we had sight or 
them oniy at topmast head, to the windward 
of us. We made what haste we could to 
them, and they staid for us till we came 
at a convenient distance, and then made 
toward us. They, having the wind, kept 
at a greater part from us than we would 
have been willingly at, and therefore -
our braver commanders, impatient of it, 
bore in upon them to go through and 
through, or which were Sir Christopher 
I•lings and Sir Robert Holmes in several 
places, that had each many brave seconds, 
and they had success enough, for by it 
we divided their f'leet and did them rouoh· 
mischief, though to eive them, the enemy, 
also their due, they soon, upon many of 
these passes that day, came together aeain 
with great art and dexterity. We made 
five passes this day, and not one 0£ them 
ended but with a good appearance and as• 
pect upon our side• in which we fired several 
0£ their ships and they not one of ours, and 
at the last of them, about five of the clock, 
we divided their fleet, fell so after them 
in the rear that in plain terms, those that 
were to leeward or us in dividing of their 
fleet, set all the sail they could and began 
to run, and while we wera in chase of them -
and picking up some of their lame geese, 
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that part ot the .fleet that was to windward 
of us tacks upon us; and being then divided, 
part with the Prince and part with the Duke 
or Albemarle, they gave th~ Duke 0£ Albemarle' a 
squadron no breath at all, but tack im-
mediately again upon us. The Prince in 
the Royal James had in the last pass lost 
his mizen and main topmast, and his squad-
ron was at such a distance that they could 
not aome to our relief, being also so 
shattered and maimed; and most of our own 
frigates, to avoid the shook, runs to 
leeward and shelter·themselvaa under the 
Royal Charles. Scarce any but the Defiance 
diverted the enemy from pouring their whole 
broadside upon us; but we bore it well enough, 
though at this time very much disabled in 
our rigging and masts; which indeed was the 
only aim of the Dutch, for the most part 
placing their shot above our hulls. De 
Ruyter soon observed the advantage he had 
by our fleets being divided and both our 
admirals disabled, that he makes aeiin a 
sudden tack upon us. My Lord General, as 
ill as his ship was, gives orders for 
tacking likewise to preserve our lamed 
frigates; but having received in the pass 
before two.shots in his powder room, between 
wind and.water, they could not be stopped 
but by standing upon the same course; besides 
our main topmast was so disabled by a shot 
through him' that we were fain to lower our 
main topsail, and our foremast had received 
so many shots that it waa the general opin-
ion there was danger or bringing her by the 
board in tacking, and no signs for any of 
the rest to tack would prevail anything 
with them, so that we were forced to see 
them fall upon our frigates in the rear, 
without being able to rescue them; but we 
saw also by this they could do us but little 
harm; indeed none at all, if the Essex had 
not most indiscreetly and unskilf'ully fallen 
foul of a prize. a Dutch frigate that we had just before taken, by which not only the . 
Ji;ssex but the said frigate tell again into 
their hands.. ·The Convertine also, being 
an old Dutch ship and a slow sailor, was 
overtaken by two of their little frigates, 
and without shooting a gun or ma.king any · 
resistance, she struck her ancient and 
yielded. We might else have brought her 
off with some of our frigates; but Captain 
Pearce, the commander, was the more to be · 
blamed for tha.t he had scarce engaged the 
whole day.. Our business was now to bear 
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away before a wind to join with tho Prince's 
squadron, and this cannot be called evon by 
the Hollanders a running away, but the 
proper course to join, which was the most 
justifiable working, and when l~e were· joined, 
the Dutch made no further after us. But by 
this time it was sunset, and most of our 
ships in an ill condition as I have told 
your lordship our two admirals ware, other 
wise we might have.steered to have met·with 
them this morning again, ror by all that· 
we can guess by the working of the enemy, 
they were to be quit of us as we of them, 
ror in that last pass before the division 
of our fleet, at least ten of .their frigates 
got homeward maimed, and perchance, if the 
two generals had been in one ship, or if 
either of the courses that either of them· 
had taken had been jointly followed, viz., 
either to have pursued them in the rear · 
that we had severed to the leeward of us, 
or to have tacked to have weathered their 
whole fleet, perchance we had done their 
work, and not have left it as it is now 
for a drawn battle; for if the losses of 
ea.ch side be considered, the enemy hath 
little cause to boast, for besides that we 
took, we burnt in t,he four days flight (sic.) 
seven of their man-of-war, and all their 
men are lost, which is a considerable one to 
them. Wo have still in custody the captain 
of the frigate we took. Now on the other 
hand, our loss of the Princa Royal was great, 
so was the Essex and the Convertine, and 
their men too aro considerable; however, 
they are not so bad as the men of· tho Dutch 
ships, tor ours are but prisoners, and re• 
deemable, and so our stock not diminished, 
whereas theirs are blown up·or drowned; 
and for our two other ships, viz., the 
Black·Eagle and St. Paul, two old Dutch 
ships, that were sunk and the other fired 
by us when she was unserviceable by shots 
and leaks, we sa_ved all the men of both, 
and I do not yet hear of any other loss 
we have, only there is discourse about the 
fleet as if the Swiftsure were taken, but· 
she hath not been seen in all their fleet, 
but on the contrary Sir John Chicheley says 
he saw.her go off clear, after the first 
pass upon· Friday. We-have net no news, 
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neither of those ships I mentioned in the 
beginning, that went off with him; we do 
yet also miss Sir Christopher r.:ings and 
the Rupert, but have no reason to doubt 
but that they are well, though not with 
us. 
The damage to the Hollands fleet must 
needs be as much if not more than ours, 
for there were left of them now, at last, 
not above J.-0, and· they were in the beginning 
S4 fighting ships. It must be confessed 
many of ours got away after the first day, 
for when Prince Rupert came to us, we ha:d 
but 34 ships, and if the King do not catise 
some of the capaains to be hanged, he will 
never be wall f.1erved. '~Je hear of two good 
ships that were coming out of the swing to 
put to sea when they heard shooting again 
they wont back; we have this relation from 
a ketch. By·this backwardness in some 0£ 
his captains, the King still loses the 
contest, for when they engage frankly and 
a:r~ not seconded, the enemy hath advnntage 
upon them, and often cuts them off t \'lhen 
·the cowardly ones still remain to omit 
their duties another time. If a severe 
cm~se be not taken in this matter, this 
5.s alone enough to ruin any great action 
of our fleot. 
This quitting 0£ the seas is more than 
ever yet the Hollnnder could obtain, and 
though it be for tho present somo honour 
to them, and may, abroad, sorne~1at lessnn 
our repu,rntion, yet that will signify but 
lit1~le to them o:r us 1 if amm.unition or 
stores be suddenly provided, for this is 
the chiefest matter that is wantj_ng, some 
of the ships havine spent all to five or 
six rounds or less; provisions also must 
be thought upon, and then 5.f' Sir Jo. Mennes 
bring rnoney enough to pay o£f tho arears, 
the men will be in better heart than ever. 
I hea:rd some of thorn mutter that they had 
twenty months behind; these things will be 
necessary to be hastened. It is also requi-
site that Sir William Coventry direct a new 
press for seamen, and if these matters can 
be dispatched, that our fleet may be upon 
their coast before they are ready, the world 
will then see who had the greatest loss, 
and the Hollanders' brags, which undoubtedly 
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they ·will set forth to the world in a h1gh 
measure, will vanish and turn to their dis-
advantage. 
1 
• 
I am not yet certain of the ntunber 0£ 
our slain and wounded, hut by my atr~cteat 
inquiry and by conferring with my Lord 
General, we conclude that there canno~ be 
less than 1500 wounded and tWO slain 6n 
our part; we have not lost many commanders 
beside Capt •. Terne, Capt. Bacon,· and the 
captains of the Uni<rorn, the 'l'riumph and 
the St. George •••• 
lareen, Sta;te Pa;eers, 1665-16,6§., pp. :x:ix-xxiv. 
12,2 
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